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In 2007, the United States and Mexico agreed to a bilateral anti-drug policy 
known as Mérida Initiative with the intent of disrupting organized crime and drug 
trafficking in Mexico. The initiative has persisted through multiple administrations on 
both sides of the border and received various scholarly criticisms for its 
oversimplification of the problem. Did funding and allocation of resources of the Mérida 
Initiative address the underlying issues that contributed to the drug trade in Mexico? 
Analyzing the historical foundations that supported the rise of organized crime in 
Mexico, combined with the factors that drive the drug trade, reveals an anti-drug policy 
focused on military operations and not on addressing the factors set forth in the initiative. 
This thesis exposes the underlying issues and analyzes allocation of resources to pinpoint 
where the focus is, and where it should be placed. 
This thesis concludes that allocation of resources is placed on security operations 
when they would be better suited on training the judicial branch in Mexico, improving 
the border, and improving the community to provide opportunities outside organized 
crime. Furthermore, the United States has steps to take to fulfil its shared responsibility. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION TO MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis answers the following question: Did funding and allocation of 
resources of the Mérida Initiative (MI) address the underlying issues that contributed to 
the drug trade in Mexico?  
Since the early 1970s, when the Nixon administration declared “war on drugs,” 
the United States has played a crucial role in the Western Hemisphere through the 
implementation of various anti-drug policies aimed at reducing the flow of illicit drugs 
into the United States.1 Accordingly, in October 2007, the United States and Mexico 
established the Mérida Initiative (MI), a bilateral agreement with the objective of 
disrupting organized crime and drug trafficking in Mexico.2 While the initiative was 
intended for both Mexico and Central America, 84 percent of the $1.6 billion, or 
approximately $1.3 billion, was allocated to Mexico between FY2008 and FY2010.3 The 
Mérida Initiative primarily provided support through training and equipment and received 
various critical evaluations after government agencies failed to obligate or spend the 
funds that were allocated for this program; according to a 2010 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report, “46 percent of Mérida funds for fiscal years 2008 to 
2010 had been obligated, and approximately 9 percent had been expended.”4  
Furthermore, in FY2009, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) made up 38 percent of the 
overall Mérida Initiative funds, and International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement (INCLE) made up another 57 percent reflecting the initial heavy focus on 
                                                 
1 Brian Bow, “Beyond Mérida? The Evolution of the U.S. Response to Mexico’s Security Crisis,” in 
The State and Security in Mexico: Transformation and Crisis in Regional Perspective, ed. by Brian Bow 
and Arturo Santa-Cruz (New York: Routledge, 2013), 82. 
2 Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative 
and Beyond, CRS Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
April 8, 2014), 6.  
3 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures by Jess T. Ford (GAO-
10-837) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), 4.   
4 Ibid., 11.  
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law enforcement and military involvement and the lack of focus on social programs.5 
Lastly, it underwent a pivotal policy shift in 2010 known as “Mérida 2.0,” or the official 
policy name, “Beyond Mérida,” which although similar to the initial plan, it added a 
specific focus on a 21st century border—one that would allow free flow of commerce and 
travel and restrict flow of illicit good, both North and South, and building strong and 
resilient communities by giving Mexican citizens social and economic opportunities 
outside of organized crime6 According to Eric Olson and Christopher Wilson, “While the 
majority of the U.S. funding in the first phase of the Merida Initiative went to expensive 
equipment, particularly aircraft, the new approach shifts the focus toward institution 
building.”7 By focusing on the fundamental issues that fuel the drug trade in Mexico, one 
can infer the most effective future anti-drug policies. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Mérida Initiative deserves continued analysis for various reasons. First, it 
provides a contemporary example of a U.S. approach to combating the global narcotics 
issue. 
Second, Mexico and the United States have become increasingly interdependent, 
and the failure of one would have devastating effects on the other. The United States and 
Mexico trade $500 billion annually as a result of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and share a nearly 2,000 mile border. Shannon O’Neil writes, 
“What Mexico will never be is far away. And the ties today between the United States 
and Mexico go far beyond sheer geography.” She goes on to say, “Bound by economic, 
environmental, cultural, familial, security, and diplomatic bonds, perhaps no other 
country is as intertwined with the United States as Mexico.”8 Furthermore, it is U.S. drug 
                                                 
5 Seelke and Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, CRS 
Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 8, 2014), 
36.  
6 Bow, “Beyond Mérida? The Evolution of the U.S. Response to Mexico’s Security Crisis,” 77; Eric L. 
Olson and Christopher E. Wilson, “Beyond Merida: The Evolving Approach to Security Cooperation,” 
May 1, 2010, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/beyond_merida.pdf. 
7 Olson and Wilson, “Beyond Merida: The Evolving Approach to Security Cooperation,” 3. 
8 Shannon O’Neil, Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States, and the Road Ahead (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 6.  
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addiction that plays a major role in Mexico’s issues. Sabrina Abu-Hamdeh writes, 
“According to recent studies, income inequality, political instability and crime have all 
contributed to the increases in violence, but the major factor is the drug trade.”9 This 
thought process extends beyond scholars. At the Mérida Conference in 2007, Felipe 
Calderon, the then President of Mexico, expressed the difficulty in reducing supply in 
Mexico while sustained demand exists in the United States.10 
Third, anti-drug policies have the potential for spillover and balloon effects, 
which can be devastating on other countries and inhibit the ability to assess policy 
effectiveness. In the case of Mexico, the spillover effects from drug trafficking travelled 
both north and south. David Pedigo comments on this phenomenon by stating, “In 2005, 
the governors of Arizona and New Mexico declared their border regions with Mexico to 
be a ‘disaster area’ on grounds that they were devastated by human smuggling, drug 
smuggling, kidnapping, murder, and destruction of property.”11 This issue is not unique 
to the United States, and some would argue that drug trafficking has had even more 
devastating effects on the weaker governments of Central America. In a chapter titled, 
“Militarization in Mexico and Its Implications,” Arturo C. Sotomayor notes that the 
movement of violent drug cartels from Mexico to Central America has resulted in 
increased homicides in this region.12 Violence is not the only thing that travels. For some 
time, scholars have observed a phenomenon known as the balloon effect, which is the 
shift in growing, producing, and transiting of drugs as a result of enforcement by 
governments and agencies.13 Once again, this practice by transnational criminal 
                                                 
9 Sabrina Abu-Hamdeh, “The Merida Initiative: An Effective Way of Reducing Violence in Mexico?” 
Pepperdine Policy Review 4, no. 1 (Spring 2011), 38.  
10 Ibid.  
11 David Pedigo, “The Drug War and State Failure in Mexico,” Midwest Journal of Undergraduate 
Studies (2012), 112.  
12 Arturo C. Sotomayor, “Militarization in Mexico and Its Implications,” in The State and Security in 
Mexico: Transformation and Crisis in Regional Perspective, edited by Brian Bow and Arturo Santa-Cruz 
(New York: Routledge, 2013), 54.  
13 For instance see, Pedigo, “The Drug War and State Failure in Mexico,” 113; Castillo, Juan Camilo, 
Daniel Mejía, and Pascual Restrepo, “Illegal Drug Markets and Violence in Mexico: The Causes Beyond 
Calderón,” Last modified February 2013. http://cie.itam.mx/SEMINARIOS/Marzo-Mayo_2013/Mejia.pdf; 
O’Neil, Two Nations Indivisible, 126. 
 4 
organizations (TCOs) makes assessing drug policies difficult, because displacement can 
portray the illusion of success. 
Fourth, MI was intended to be a “shared responsibility” between Mexico and the 
United States, which involves commitments on both sides of the borders; in a 2014 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, they write, “As part of the Mérida 
Initiative’s emphasis on shared responsibility, the Mexican government pledged to tackle 
crime and corruption and the U.S. government pledged to address drug demand and the 
illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico.”14 However, the United States 
appeared to not uphold its end of the bargain—Mexican DTOs continued to smuggle bulk 
cash estimated at $15 to $25 billion per year south through the border, laundered bulk 
cash through U.S. financial institutions, received 90–95 percent of their weapons from 
the United States, and U.S. policymakers continued to focus their policies on supply side 
intervention, not demand reduction programs.15 The United States is largely responsible 
for the issues in Mexico, and must continue to evaluate their role, and the repercussions 
of their decisions in the war on drugs. 
Lastly, despite this outward attempt at bilateral cooperation, drug related violence 
in Mexico has skyrocketed with more than 60,000 deaths between December 2006 and 
November 2012.16 Although homicides decreased by 9 percent in 2013, kidnapping and 
extortion rose by approximately 20.5 percent and 10.6 percent, respectively.17 This 
phenomenon has been attributed to the decentralization and fractionalization of the DTOs 
due to the direct conflict with Mexican forces, which has caused them to expand their 
                                                 
14 Seelke and Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, CRS 
Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 8, 2014), 6. 
15 Shannon O’Neil, “The Real War in Mexico: How Democracy Can Defeat the Drug Cartels,” 
Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (2009), 70–71; O’Neil, Two Nations Indivisible, 127; Stephanie Erin Brewer, 
“Rethinking the Mérida Initiative: Why the U.S. Must Change Course in its Approach to Mexico’s Drug 
War,” Human Rights Brief 16, no. 3 (2009): 11, http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/16/3brewer.pdf. 
16 Seelke and Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, CRS 
Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 8, 2014), 1. 
17 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report: Volume I Drug and Chemical Control” (2014).  
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criminal activities.18 Furthermore, according to George Grayson, “heroin, cocaine, 
methamphetamine and other illicit substances are more available than ever before.”19 In 
fact, according to the 2013 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World 
Drug Report, illicit drug use in the United States remained stable, with a slight increase 
of cocaine consumption in Mexico.20 Furthermore, additional sources approximate that 
90–95 percent of cocaine sold in the United States transits through Mexico, which 
exhibits the critical importance of bilateral security cooperation between these two 
countries.21 In addition to violent crime and drug consumption, the legal system in 
Mexico confronts similar issues—“less than 13 percent of all crimes are reported in 
Mexico.”22 In closing, U.S. politicians, government officials, and scholars have 
repeatedly alluded to or discussed the potential of Mexico becoming a failed state.23 
While most scholars dismiss the notion that Mexico is in danger of becoming a failed 
state, the fact that it is a discussion is enough of a red flag, and this debate will be 
discussed in greater detail throughout this thesis. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A wide array of literature exists concerning anti-drug policy, which includes 
debates over success or failure, historical origins, collateral damage, and policy 
                                                 
18 Luis Astorga and David A. Shirk, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in 
the U.S.- Mexican Context,” in Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting 
Organized Crime, ed. by Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk, and Andrew Selee (Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars – Mexico Institute; San Diego: University of San Diego Trans-
border Institute, 2010), 43. 
19 George Grayson, Mexico: Narco Violence and a Failed State? (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2010), 264. 
20 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2013 (Vienna, Austria: United 
Nations, 2013), 12–13. 
21 O’Neil, “The Real War in Mexico, 66; Clare Seelke and Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security 
Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, CRS Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Library of 
Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 8, 2014), 2.  
22 Seelke and Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, CRS 
Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 8, 2014), 
14.   
23 For instance see, Bow, “Beyond Mérida,” 80; Grayson, Mexico: Narco Violence and a Failed 
State? 267–278; Paul Kenny and Mónica Serrano, “Introduction: Security Failure Versus State Failure” in 
Mexico’s Security Failure: Collapse into Criminal Violence, eds. Paul Kenny and Mónica Serrano with 
Arturo Sotomayor (New York: Routledge, 2012), 9. 
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recommendations. Although this literature utilizes a variety of approaches for analysis 
with varied outcomes, the majority can be separated into two groups—advocacy and 
criticism. This paper will primarily focus on the Mérida Initiative, but it is necessary to 
review the literature of U.S. anti-drug policy advocates and critics to understand the 
various approaches and historical trends of U.S. policies abroad. This section will present 
various scholarly discussions concerning the drug trade and anti-drug policies. First, it 
will present the various arguments related to types of drug control, which will focus 
specifically on demand and supply focused anti-drug policies and the effectiveness of 
interdiction and eradication. Second, it will discuss similarities and differences between 
Mexico and Colombia. Third, it will discuss obstacles for Mexico’s success in the drug 
trade, which include corruption, weak law enforcement and judicial system, and legacies 
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) regime. Fourth, it will discuss possible 
side-effects stemming from MI, which include spillover violence, both North and South; 
militarization; and human rights violations. Lastly, it will present various scholarly 
recommendations and critiques of MI. Upon understanding general discussion among 
scholars concerning anti-drug policies, this paper will shift focus to specific literature 
pertaining to MI, and its effects on the drug market, security, and U.S.-Mexico relations. 
1. Various Types of Drug Control 
One of the many debates among scholars and politicians is assessing the 
effectiveness of supply and demand focused anti-drug policies. Historically, the United 
States has primarily been a proponent of supply side anti-drug policies, which includes 
interdiction, alternate development programs (ADPs), crop eradication, and other 
activities that focus on interrupting the supply of illicit drugs to the United States. 
Essentially, the goal of supply side intervention is reducing the supply of illicit 
substances through the various aforementioned means, which in turn will result in a rise 
in price, and ideally make the illicit good too expensive for consumers and discourage its 
use.24 Concerning the funding of the supply side approach, Shannon O’Neil comments, 
                                                 
24 Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, “The U.S. ‘War on Drugs’: Its Impact in Latin America and 
the Caribbean,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, eds. Coletta A. 
Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 3. 
 7 
“Roughly two-thirds of the money spent by the U.S. government in the war on drugs goes 
to the supply side.”25 She goes on to observe that treatment programs for heavy users 
tends to be the most cost-effective solution that U.S. policymakers have in their 
repertoire—to be exact, three times as effective in comparison to prevention and punitive 
measures.26 Thomas Babor discusses various other solutions; these include alternate 
development programs (ADPs); interdiction with the intent of incarcerating individuals 
involved; prescription regimes, which is typically in developed countries that allow 
narcotics for prescription use and attempt to control those drugs against improper use; 
decriminalization; increased penalties against drug users; prevention programs; and 
treatment of users.27 However, he follows these proposals by discerning the lack of 
evidence supporting the effectiveness of supply control policies.28 Lastly, he notes that 
adequate evidence exists that supports the use of treatment for drug dependence, or 
demand control.29 Despite their optimism for treatment programs, Peter Reuter, a 
renowned drug policy author, has a bleak outlook towards treatment’s long-term success. 
In an article titled, “How Can Domestic U.S. Drug Policy Help Mexico,” he discusses the 
various challenges associated with anti-drug programs: 
Few of even the most innovative programs have shown substantial and 
lasting effect, while almost none of the popular programs have any 
positive evaluation. Treatment can be shown to reduce both drug 
consumption and the associated harms of drug dependent clients. 
However, given the chronic relapsing nature of drug dependence, it is 
unlikely that treatment expansion will have large effects on aggregate 
consumption. Enforcement, aimed at dealers and traffickers, which has 
received the dominant share of funds for drug control, has failed to 
                                                 
25 O’Neil, Two Nations Indivisible, 149.    
26 Ibid.    
27 Thomas F. Babor, “The Public Health Impact of Drug Policies,” in Rethinking the “War on Drugs” 
Through the US-Mexico Prism, eds. Ernesto Zedillo and Haynie Wheeler (New Haven, CT: Yale Center 
for the Study of Globalization, 2012), 74–78. 
28 Ibid., 75.  
29 Ibid., 79.  
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prevent price declines; thus supply side efforts are unlikely to reduce the 
demand for Mexican source drugs.30 
Beyond these points, he articulates that demand reduction programs in consumer 
countries, like the United States, tend to have political support, but prevention programs 
are ineffective and treatment programs would require a 25 percent expansion in funding 
to reduce cocaine consumption by about 6 percent.31 He goes on to suggest that the most 
promising solution comes from studies conducted in Hawaii, where community 
supervision of parolees and probationers resulted in promising outcomes for reduced drug 
use.32 Although scholars continuously evaluate the effectiveness of supply and demand 
side anti-drug policies, U.S. policymakers continue to favor supply side intervention—
specifically, interdiction and eradication.33 
Dating back to the 1990s, the GAO recognized the futile efforts of interdiction 
and eradication—specifically in Central America; they asserted that attempts to intercept 
traffickers “has had little impact on the flow of drugs to the United States.”34 In an 
Organization of American States (OAS) report, they observe that interdiction efforts have 
further compounded the issue by diverting the location of production and trafficking, 
hence the increased role of Mexico in the drug trade.35 This territorial displacement plays 
a significant role on the municipality level as well. According to their report, the 
movement of criminal networks within a nation, between cities and states, and as a result 
of government pressure, does not necessarily decrease violence in the previous area of 
                                                 
30 Peter Reuter, “How Can Domestic U.S. Drug Policy Help Mexico?” in Shared Responsibility: U.S.-
Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime, eds. Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk, and Andrew 
Selee (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars – Mexico Institute; San Diego: 
University of San Diego Trans-border Institute, 2010), 121. 
31 Ibid., 136.  
32 Ibid., 121. 
33 For instance see, Reuter, “How Can Domestic U.S. Drug Policy Help Mexico?” 121; Kenny and 
Serrano, “Introduction: Security Failure Versus State Failure,” 15; Youngers and Rosin, “The U.S. ‘War on 
Drugs’: Its Impact in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 1–3; O’Neil, Two Nations Indivisible, 149. 
34 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Drug Control: Interdiction Efforts in Central America 
have had Little Impact on the Flow of Drugs (GAO/NSAID-94-233) (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 4. 
35 Organization of American States, “The Drug Problem in the Americas,” May 17, 2013, 43–50, 
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf. 
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criminal occupation.36 This means that combating DTOs in one municipality would 
move their violence to another municipality while leaving a grasp for power and the 
corresponding instability in the previous one. Furthermore, interdiction efforts in the 
United States accounted for 15 percent of total federal drug spending in 2012, but 
according to Beau Kilmer, Jonathan Caulkins, Rosalie Pacula, and Peter Reuter of the 
RAND Corporation these efforts did little more than “shift methods and routes by which 
the drugs are shipped.”37 However, in a previous and pivotal study, Peter Reuter, Gordon 
Crawford, and Jonathan Cave note that interdiction has functions beyond reducing drug 
use; it presents risks for traffickers, indicates that the United States takes this issue 
seriously to other countries, and these scholars recommend continuing interdiction 
efforts.38 Despite this apparent support for continued interdiction, Paul Kenny and 
Monica Serrano cite previous work from Peter Reuter by stating, “if the United States 
had been able to successfully interdict 50 percent of all cocaine coming from Colombia, 
the cheapness of replacement would have meant that less than 3 percent would have been 
added to its retail price in America.”39 Additionally, interdiction may deserve blame for 
the upsurge in drugs and violence in Mexico. Nigel Inkster and Virginia Comolli attribute 
the rise in prevalence of Mexican cartels to U.S. seizures of drugs in the Caribbean, 
essentially closing this route down and forcing Colombian cartels to seek alternate 
solutions.40 As with all other topics concerning the drug trade, the opinions on 
interdiction operations vary and continue to be a topic of discussion among scholars and 
policy makers. 
                                                 
36 Organization of American States, “The Drug Problem in the Americas,” 50. 
37 Beau Kilmer et al., The U.S. Drug Policy Landscape: Insights and Opportunities for Improving the 
View (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2012), 12. 
38 Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave. Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased 
Military Participation in Drug Interdiction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1988), 130. 
39 Kenny and Serrano, “Introduction: Security Failure Versus State Failure,” 15.  
40 Nigel Inkster and Virginia Comolli, “Chapter Four: The Transit Regions,” Adelphi Series 52, no. 
428 (2012): 88, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19443371.2012.677278. 
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2. Mexico and Colombia 
Mexico was not the first country to receive aid and support from the United 
States, and the Mérida Initiative has often been compared to previously implemented 
policies, such as Plan Colombia. On this topic, Arturo Sotomayor writes, “No other U.S. 
initiative has had so much influence on Mexico’s strategies toward drug trafficking as 
Plan Colombia.”41 Furthermore, he discusses the evolution of Plan Colombia from a drug 
oriented strategy to one focused on counter-insurgency and security.42 John Bailey 
argues that utilizing the same fundamental concepts in Mexico as in Colombia was a 
misunderstanding of the issues at hand. He goes on to explain the various differences 
between the two countries, which includes size, population, economy, government 
systems, law enforcement and justice systems, and proximity to the United States.43 
Shannon O’Neil agrees with this fundamental misunderstanding of the challenges and 
states, “Most important, the focus of this aid is too narrow, reflecting a misunderstanding 
of Mexico’s fundamental challenge. Unlike Colombia, which had to retake swaths of 
territory from guerilla groups, paramilitary organizations, and drug cartels, the Mexican 
state has been able to quell the rising violence when it has deployed large and well-armed 
military units.”44 Lastly, Brian Bow discusses both positive and negative outlooks within 
the United States concerning utilizing the Plan Colombia model in Mexico; on a positive 
note, it led to the capturing or killing of cartel leaders and an eventual decline in violence, 
but he also alludes to the “explosive increase in violence” and militarization of security 
forces in Mexico with little to no impact on the flow of drugs as a reference to its 
negative effects.45 Scholars discuss more than the origins and influence of MI, they also 
analyze various obstacles inhibiting outright success or challenging the ability to properly 
assess its progress. 
                                                 
41 Sotomayor, “Militarization in Mexico and Its Implications,” 46. 
42 Ibid. 
43 John Bailey, “Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative: Policy Twins or Distant Cousins?” 
Georgetown University. Last modified February, 9 2009, 2–3, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Security/
referencematerials/Bailey.doc. 
44 O’Neil, “The Real War in Mexico,” 72.  
45 Bow, “Beyond Mérida?” 83. 
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3. Obstacles for Mexico’s Success 
Various obstacles exist that inhibit policy implementation in Mexico, which 
includes corruption, weakness of law enforcement and judicial systems, and legacies of 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) regime. On the topic of corruption, Shannon 
O’Neil writes, “Mexico’s Achilles’ heel is corruption—which in an electoral democracy 
cannot be stabilizing the way it was in the days of Mexico’s autocracy.”46 Additionally, 
Brian Bow points out the improper order of intervention that the Mexican and U.S. 
governments chose in battling the DTOs, and he suggests that corruption should have 
been dealt with prior to confronting DTOs, but it still could be addressed during 
confrontation.47 On a related note, scholars and critics have commented on the weakness 
of Mexico’s law enforcement agencies and judicial system. In a 2014 CRS report, the 
authors write, “While bilateral efforts have yielded some positive results, the apparent 
weakness of Mexico’s criminal justice system seems to have limited the effectiveness of 
anti-crime efforts.”48 The justice system was so ineffective in its role that it inhibited the 
progress made by the other branches of the government. On this topic, Kenny and 
Serrano cite that between 2007 and 2010, of the 70,000 arrests related to organized crime, 
98 percent were released due to lack of evidence to proceed to trial.49 Needless to say, 
this made inhibiting organized crime difficult in Mexico, and exhibits the weakness of 
evidence collection performed by law enforcement agencies and a lack of capacity in the 
judicial system. The legacies of the PRI government and their relationship with organized 
criminal groups created considerable amounts of tension between DTOs and the new 
government regime. Shannon O’Neil traces this relationship back to the early twentieth 
century when Mexico played a major role in illegal trade of alcohol during U.S. alcohol 
prohibition; this was the beginning of a mutually beneficial relationship.50 If that was the 
beginning then the 2000 election was the end; Brian Bow observes, “the Institutional 
                                                 
46 O’Neil, “The Real War in Mexico,” 72.  
47 Bow, “Beyond Mérida?” 92.  
48 Seelke and Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, CRS 
Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 8, 2014), 1.  
49 Kenny and Serrano, “Introduction: Security Failure Versus State Failure,” 13.   
50 O’Neil, “The Real War in Mexico,” 65. 
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Revolutionary Party’s (PRI’s) defeat in the 2000 elections shook patron-client 
relationships throughout the country, including those that connected national and local 
officials to drug-trafficking organizations.”51 Kenny and Serrano comment on the danger 
of implementing policy that could reinforce authoritarian legacies, more specifically the 
use of armed forces.52 
4. Possible Side Effects from Mérida Initiative 
Besides discussing the obstacles, various scholars have devoted considerable 
attention to the side effects or outcomes of the MI, which will be examined below. 
Among these side effects are spillover, militarization of Mexico, and human rights 
violations. As discussed previously, increased focus on combatting DTOs has created a 
shift in operations—one of the new areas of operation is in Central America. In a 2009 
CRS report, they observe, “Mexican DTOs are increasingly expanding their operations 
into Central America, a region in which officials have even less training and equipment 
to deal with DTOs and criminal gangs than their Mexican counterparts.”53 Beyond a shift 
in operations and violence is the fear of corruption crossing the borders. On this topic, 
Shannon O’Neil comments, “The most worrisome is corruption, as the money seeping 
across the border does not distinguish between blue and green passports.”54 She goes on 
to observe that out of the 10 percent of border patrol applicants required to take a lie-
detector test, half of them have failed, which raises “serious concerns about the integrity 
of recent border patrol hires.”55 Arturo Sotomayor writes extensively on the topic of 
militarization and related human rights issues. First, he states that the choice of Mexico’s 
military strategy can be attributed to international and domestic pressures.56 On a related 
topic, Laurie Freeman and Jorge Sierra discuss U.S. influence and state, “With U.S. 
                                                 
51 Bow, “Beyond Mérida?” 82. 
52 Kenny and Serrano, “Introduction: Security Failure Versus State Failure,” 19.   
53 Clare Ribando Seelke, Congressional Research Service. Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central 
America: Funding and Policy Issues, CRS Report R40135 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, August 21, 2009), 1. 
54 O’Neil, Two Nations Indivisible, 130.    
55 Ibid., 131    
56 Sotomayor, “Militarization in Mexico and Its Implications,” 42. 
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encouragement and material assistance, Mexico has increased the role of its military in 
the fight against drugs and relegated civilians to a lower level of participation.”57 Second, 
Arturo Sotomayor argues that this influence and corresponding militarization has 
“increased human-rights abuses committed by troops, eroded civilian oversight, and 
undermined coordination efforts between security agencies.”58 Stephanie Brewer 
emphasizes this point by stating, “In light of these criteria, the most severe flaw in MI is 
that it reinforces the war-like mentality that has led Mexico to deploy its military and 
police in a territorial battle against criminals as the answer to drug trafficking.”59 Lastly, 
Arturo Sotomayor asserts that the militarization in Mexico has caused more damage than 
good by instigating “more violence and insecurity.”60 
Beyond militarization and its role in human rights violations, considerable 
attention has been given to the use of military in combatting drugs. Roderic Ai Camp 
notes the predominant role that the military took in anti-drug operations in Mexico 
beginning in the mid-1990s and the steady increase throughout the Zedillo, Fox, and 
Calderón administrations, with historical legacies dating back to the 1930s.61 
Unfortunately, one side-effect of military involvement in domestic law enforcement 
matters is an increase in human rights complaints.62 Cornelius Friesendorf argues that 
U.S. military aid can compound the issue of human rights abuses by increasing the 
overall capacity of foreign nations’ militaries and destabilizing civilian control.63 
Furthermore, Camp argues, “The intensive, uncompromising federal strategy to defeat 
                                                 
57 Laurie Freeman and Jorge Luis Sierra, “Mexico: The Militarization Trap,” in Drugs and Democracy 
in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, eds. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 294. 
58 Sotomayor, “Militarization in Mexico and Its Implications,” 43. 
59 Brewer, “Rethinking the Mérida Initiative,” 10. 
60 Sotomayor, “Militarization in Mexico and Its Implications,” 53. 
61 Roderic Ai Camp, “Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges,” in 
Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime, eds. Eric L. Olson, 
David A. Shirk, and Andrew Selee (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars – 
Mexico Institute; San Diego: University of San Diego Trans-border Institute, 2010), 292–297. 
62 Ibid., 319.  
63 Cornelius Friesendorf, “Squeezing the Balloon: United States Air Interdiction and the Restructuring 
of the South American Drug Industry in the 1990s,” Crime, Law & Social Change 44, no. 1 (2005): 37, doi: 
10.1007/s10611-006-9005-9. 
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and destroy the drug cartels has contributed to increased levels of violence, and to the rise 
of homicides and other criminal activity.”64 However, Juan Castillo, Daniel Mejía, and 
Pascual Restrepo differ in their opinion of Calderon’s aggressive use of the military, 
stating that the increase in violence can be attributed to large amounts of cocaine seizures 
in Colombia occurring simultaneously—almost a balloon effect of violence.65 Lastly, 
Scott Decker and Margaret Chapman state that increased participation of the military and 
their resources will not necessarily decrease the availability of cocaine.66 What does this 
mean? Scholars vary on their opinions of militaries’ role in anti-drug operations; some 
feel that it creates an increase in violence, encourages a break-down in civil-military 
relations, and provides the opportunity for human right violations, while others argue that 
it is a duty of the military, that violence is due to external issues not under their control, 
and that they maintain their prestige within society.67 This thesis will continue to explore 
these issues and determine whether the use of uniformed services in anti-drug operations 
is essential or detrimental. Considering the military’s role is often eradication of crops or 
interdiction of drugs, it is also important to discuss scholarly opinions on the 
effectiveness of these operations and policies as a whole. 
5. Mérida Initiative Critiques and Recommendations 
The final topic to be discussed in this section is the wide range of policy 
recommendations and critiques of the Mérida Initiative. It is important to note that policy 
issues extend beyond U.S. borders and should be the product of collaboration among all 
nations involved. Nigel Inkster and Virginia Comolli observe the ability of traffickers to 
“exploit existing weaknesses” in regions, whether they are lack of state oversight, poor 
                                                 
64 Ai Camp, “Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges,” 301–302. 
65 Castillo, Mejía, and Restrepo, “Illegal Drug Markets and Violence in Mexico,” 3–4.  
66 Scott H. Decker and Margaret Townsend Chapman, Drug Smugglers on Drug Smuggling 
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2008), 13. Decker and Chapman base this assertion off a 
previous study in Reuter, Crawford, and Cave, Sealing the Borders. 
67 For further discussion of this issue, see Castillo, Mejía, and Restrepo, “Illegal Drug Markets and 
Violence in Mexico: The Causes Beyond Calderón.”; Ai Camp, “Armed Forces and Drugs: Public 
Perceptions and Institutional Challenges.”; Friesendorf, “Squeezing the Balloon: United States Air 
Interdiction and the Restructuring of the South American Drug Industry in the 1990s.”; Decker and 
Chapman, Drug Smugglers on Drug Smuggling.  
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economic conditions, lack of education, etc., they allow DTOs to exploit the labor force 
and corrupt government officials necessary to thrive in their trade.68 This view expresses 
the necessity to reallocate the funds spent on anti-drug operations to social programs—an 
indirect solution in the war on drugs. David A. Shirk suggests that justice reforms taking 
place in Mexico throughout the last few years provides hope for improving transparency, 
accountability, and due process in Mexico—an issue that has inhibited the democratic 
rule of law and bred corruption.69 On a related note, Stephanie Brewer observes that 
policy should focus on the stimulus not the symptoms, or in other words, the demand of 
illicit drug emanating from the United States70 Furthermore, some scholars argue that 
policies similar to MI are the worst solution to the drug problem. For instance, Kenny and 
Serrano argue that, “As strenuously as possible, this book contends that those policies are 
the worst road for a state with security problems like Mexico’s to go down. In the short 
term, they increase violence; in the mid-term, they compromise the integrity of its armed 
forces; and in the long term, they make the state more authoritarian.”71 Lastly, the 2014 
CRS report presents questions that must be explored in order to better understand the past 
and future implications of anti-drug policy in Mexico and abroad; they question, “What 
have been the results of the MI thus far? How is the State Department measuring the 
efficacy of Mérida programs? How have Mérida programs been affected by the Peña 
Nieto government’s new security strategy and how is coordination advancing? To what 
extent is the Mexican government moving judicial and police reform efforts forward, and 
how is U.S. assistance supporting those reforms?”72 Wide varieties of policy 
recommendations exist, but which one is the most effective and cost efficient? This thesis 
will weigh the options based off of decades of scholarly policy evaluation. 
                                                 
68 Inkster and Comolli, “Chapter Four: The Transit Regions,” 110. 
69 David A. Shirk, “Justice Reform in Mexico: Change & Challenges in the Judicial Sector,” in Shared 
Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime, eds. Eric L. Olson, David A. 
Shirk, and Andrew Selee (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars – Mexico 
Institute; San Diego: University of San Diego Trans-border Institute, 2010), 205. 
70 Brewer, “Rethinking the Mérida Initiative,” 9.  
71 Kenny and Serrano, “Introduction: Security Failure Versus State Failure,” 19.  
72 Seelke and Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, CRS 
Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 8, 2014), 
Summary.   
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis provides a historical analysis of U.S.-Mexico relations and challenges 
relating to illicit substances. By relying on mostly secondary sources, this thesis will 
assess various hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that the Mérida Initiative was in 
fact heavily influenced by previous anti-drug policies in the Western Hemisphere. In so 
doing, the United States improperly assessed the situation in Mexico and implemented 
flawed policies, which made the situation worse, not better. Second, policy makers did 
little to alter or adjust policies in the face of policy failures. Finally, the implementation 
of a flawed policy increased violence and organized crime in Mexico. Hence, this thesis 
follows a sequential structure, in which the confirmation of one set of hypothesis leads to 
another set of cause and effect relationships. 
One major challenge in evaluating the successes and failures of anti-drug policies 
is the way in which the illicit market operates—one must necessarily assume that it is 
based heavily on educated estimates or reports of individuals involved. Unfortunately, 
drug smugglers do not typically share trade secrets voluntarily, but some of the scholarly 
resources provide statements from incarcerated former drug dealers.73 Furthermore, I will 
rely on various governmental sources with accurate estimations of statistics to ensure 
consistency and reliability of my figures. 
Moreover, I expect to reveal incongruous allocation of resources, which resulted 
in fragmented DTOs and increased violence. I also anticipate a balloon effect stemming 
from Mexico’s role in the drug trade, which in turn affects Central America, the 
Caribbean, and the Andean region. As the use of Mexican drug routes increases during 
this discussed time frame, economic inequality, failing legal system, and lack of 
government presence in all municipalities presented an ideal environment for the rise of 
TCOs and DTOs. I also expect to discern the failure extending beyond policy to various 
institutions that were and still are ill equipped to combat the dynamic market of illicit 
drug trade. 
                                                 
73 For instance see, Decker and Chapman, Drug Smugglers on Drug Smuggling. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
For this thesis utilizes a historical study of U.S. anti-drug policies, and their 
effectiveness in achieving their intended purpose. Specifically, this thesis will focus on 
historical trends and challenges of U.S.-Mexico relations related to the trafficking of 
illicit drugs, dating back to the 1970s up until the contemporary Peña Nieto and Obama 
administrations. Furthermore, it will analyze prior collaborative attempts of the United 
States and Mexico in combatting the illicit drug market, and other U.S. policies in Latin 
America—specifically, the Andean region and the Caribbean. The rise of violence, drug 
use, and corruption in Mexico is a troubling issue for U.S.-Mexico security relations and 
has endangered the recent and fragile opening of the political system in Mexico. It is 
crucial to evaluate the policies implemented in the past decades to reevaluate and refocus 
future policies on inhibiting these issues. 
In order to support my historical analysis I will rely on statistical data to evaluate 
the effectiveness of policies. Specifically, I will focus on resources—personnel, financial, 
and equipment—allocated to fighting the war on drugs. Then examine how these 
resources evolved over time as violence escalated and drugs continued to flow across the 
border. 
I utilized a wide array of sources, including but not limited to: government reports 
such as Congressional Research Service (CRS) and Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), international and regional institution reports such as United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Organization of American States (OAS), scholarly 
journals, various books and articles on the topic, and policy papers. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will assess the effectiveness of U.S. anti-drug policy, specifically MI. 
It will do so by gathering data and relying on previous empirical studies. This chapter one 
has served as an introduction. Chapter two will analyze the conditions in Mexico that 
fostered the rise of DTOs in the drug trade and the corresponding violence. It will do so 
by addressing scholarly debate concerning the judicial system, law enforcement, and 
government corruption, as well as the significance in the shift of drug routes and the 
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historical relationship between Mexican DTOs and the PRI government. Furthermore, 
this chapter will address scholarly debate concerning the potential of Mexico becoming a 
failed stated, and provide an assertion for the causes of violence in Mexico at the time the 
Mérida Initiative was implemented. 
The third chapter will discuss the fundamental policy changes in 2010 under the 
Obama administration, known as “Beyond Mérida,” or “Mérida 2.0.”74 Essentially, this 
section seeks to understand the origins of this shift, and the effects in Mexico. It will 
discuss the overall goals, examine the plan to get these goals accomplished, assess 
whether the resources fit within the framework, and analyze the implications on U.S.-
Mexico relations in the war on drugs. 
In the conclusive chapter, a list of comprehensive policy recommendations will be 
provided. More specifically, this chapter will rely on scholarly analysis of the Mérida 
Initiative. In this chapter, the thesis will finally attempt to answer the following question: 
did funding and allocation of resources address the underlying issues that contributed to 
the drug trade in Mexico? 
  
                                                 
74 Bow, “Beyond Mérida?” 77. 
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II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DRUG TRADE IN 
MEXICO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The sudden outbreak of violence in Mexico at the turn of the 21st century 
surprised scholars and politicians, frightened individuals in southern U.S. states that 
fighting between drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and Mexican officials might 
“spillover” the border, and created an impetus for reorganized U.S./Mexican relations in 
the war on drugs. The situation in Mexico was the result of a combination of various 
events and conditions that culminated in abrupt and unprecedented levels of violence 
throughout various states in Mexico. These events led many to question Mexico’s ability 
to challenge the rising power and influence of DTOs. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide historical foundations of the drug-trade in Mexico to better understand the 
challenges addressed by the Mérida Initiative. Hence, this chapter will analyze the 
conditions that stimulated the increased role of DTOs in Mexico and address the notion 
that Mexico doesn’t have the capacity to combat DTOs and is institutionally fragile.  
This chapter will be divided into four sections. Section one will explain how 
Mexican institutions have been historically weak to deal with organized crime. Section 
two will focus on drug routes and their relationship to Mexican DTOs. Section three will 
explain the negative repercussions of weak gun legislation in the United States. Finally, 
the last section will discuss the possibility of Mexico becoming a failed state and not 
having the capacity to overcome the DTOs prominence in Mexico. The reason for 
analyzing these four areas is to understand (1) What factors led to an increased role of 
Mexican DTOs in the illicit drug trade? (2) What generated the outbreak of violence in 
Mexico? and (3) Does Mexico have the capacity to win the war on drugs, with or without 
support from the United States? By understanding these factors and their contribution to 
the rise of violence and power of DTOs in Mexico, one can better understand the focus of 
funding of the Mérida Initiative. 
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B. WEAKNESS OF MEXICAN INSTITUTIONS 
 One of the major areas of focus in the Mérida Initiative is addressing the weak 
rule of law and historically poor respect for human rights, which has plagued Mexico and 
inhibited its ability to combat DTOs.75 Emphasizing the importance of this area, a 2015 
CRS Report states, “Reforming Mexico’s corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system 
is widely regarded as crucial for combating criminality, strengthening the rule of law, and 
better protecting citizen security and human rights in the country.”76 Furthermore, the 
long-time governing party of Mexico, the PRI, had a long-standing relationship with drug 
traffickers, which was disrupted in the 80s and 90s as they lost grip of their political 
power.77 On this topic, Shannon O’Neil writes, “This arrangement limited violence 
against public officials, top traffickers, and civilians; made sure that court investigations 
never reached the upper ranks of cartels; and defined the rule of the game for 
traffickers.”78 Many scholars associate the rise in violence to a transition of political 
power, which appears to be an oversimplification of the problem, which will be explored 
in the political corruption subsection. This section will focus specifically on these areas 
and how they contributed to the rise in violence in Mexico and the rise in prominence of 
Mexican DTOs at the turn of the century. More specifically, it will attempt to answer the 
following question: What makes Mexican institutions ill-suited to deal with organized 
crime? In order to answer this question, this section will be broken into three sections. 
The first will analyze Mexico’s criminal justice system and its shortfalls, the second will 
address human-rights abuses, and the third will discuss the client-patron relationship of 
the PRI and DTOs. 
                                                 
75 For instance see, Seelke and Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative 
and Beyond, CRS Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
April 8, 2014), 10–14.  
76 Seelke and Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, CRS 
Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 7, 2015), 10.  
77 O’Neil, “The Real War in Mexico,” 65.  
78 Ibid.  
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1. Mexico’s Criminal Justice System 
One of the major areas that anti-drug policies need to focus on is strengthening 
institutions and addressing corruption. In a 2014 CRS Report, authors observe, “While 
bilateral efforts have yielded some positive results, the apparent weakness of Mexico’s 
criminal justice seems to have limited the effectiveness of anti-crime efforts.”79 One of 
the major issues surrounding local governments is the ability to successfully prosecute 
common crimes.80 Most scholarly assessments concerning the prosecution of common 
crimes reveals that local governments punish 5 percent of these crimes, which includes 
homicide; that means that a person in Mexico can kill another and have a 95 percent 
probability of getting away with that crime.81 Furthermore, the rise of violence in Mexico 
simply overwhelmed this system and despite record number of arrests, they seldom 
resulted in successful convictions.82 Therefore, even if the police were arresting guilty 
parties, the system as a whole did not have the efficiency or capacity to prosecute and 
incarcerate, which results in criminals fearing little more than having their time wasted. 
Concerning this issue, authors of a report titled Drug Violence in Mexico state, “All this 
points to a need to raise the professional standards for police and prosecutors through a 
more effective system of public defenders and greater adherence to due process in 
the administration of justice in Mexico. Indeed, the best quality control of the judicial 
system is a good public defender system.”83 David Shirk writes extensively on this issue; 
he writes, “In a 2007 Gallup poll, only 37% of Mexicans responded positively to the 
question, ‘do you have confidence in Mexico’s judicial system?,’ while 58% said ‘no’ 
and 4% ‘don’t know.’”84 Even more disturbing than these numbers, only 10 percent of 
                                                 
79 Seelke and Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, CRS 
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Mexicans had confidence in police agencies.85 It is clear that reforming the judicial 
system in Mexico is critical and its historical inefficiency contributed to an environment 
that facilitated the expansion of DTOs. 
That being said, corruption has and continues to plague all levels of Mexican 
government.86 Luis Astorga discusses this issue and the volatile environment at the end 
of the PRI era; he states, “In the political changeover, the central power faced a complex 
problem: the federal security institutions were corrupt and weakened, with thousands of 
local police officers being dependent on politicians of different parties.”87 This is not a 
contemporary issue, just one that has become more blatant since the opening of the 
political system. Furthermore, a 2015 CRS Report states, “While corruption has most 
often plagued municipal and state police forces, federal police officers have been 
involved in drug trafficking and kidnapping as well.”88 By utilizing federal police to 
combat DTOs, this exposed them to corruption and provided opportunities to accept 
bribes from wealthy drug traffickers. Other authors write extensively on this issue as 
well. Shannon O’Neil observes, “Mexico’s Achilles’ heel is corruption—which in an 
electoral democracy cannot be stabilizing the way it was in the days of Mexico’s 
autocracy.”89 Furthermore, Daniel Sabet writes, “Mexico’s chapter of Transparency 
International, Transparencia Mexicana A.C., has conducted surveys measuring self-
reported bribe payments that have consistently found that bribes to transit police officers 
and public security personnel top their list of the most common acts of corruption in 
Mexico.”90 In order to have a successful anti-drug policy, these issues must be addressed, 
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and they have laid the foundations for DTOs to gain power in Mexico. One of the 
dangers when addressing a weak police force is the tendency to rely heavily on the 
military, which leads to another peril—human rights abuses. 
2. Human Rights Abuses 
Human-rights abuse is not only a historical weak point for Mexican law 
enforcement but also a danger anytime a country begins to militarize. It has been a 
tendency for the United States to advocate militarization in the war on drugs dating back 
to the Nixon Administration.91 That being said, this section will be broken into two sub-
sections. The first will analyze the historical tendency of police forces in Mexico to 
commit human-rights abuses. The second will analyze the danger of militarization and 
the likelihood for this to deteriorate civilian-military relations and deteriorate the often 
positive reputation of the military. 
Mexican police have a historical reputation for human-rights abuses. On this 
topic, Sabet writes, “Transit police were most often accused of soliciting bribes; 
preventive police were most often accused of threats to be charged on false grounds, 
insults and humiliations, and soliciting bribes; and ministerial police were most often 
accused of threats to obtain a confession, to cause harm, or to charge on false grounds.”92 
He goes on to state, “In addition, human rights commission reports have detailed specific 
cases of police excesses.”93 In a 2014 CRS Report, the authors write, “Increasing human 
rights abuses by authorities at all levels, as well as Mexico’s inability to investigate and 
punish those accused of abuses, are also pressing concerns.”94 This is a major issue that 
undermines the work being done by law enforcement personnel and is the reason why 
pillar two of the Mérida Initiative is specifically focused on this issue. This appears to 
stem back to the historical use of law enforcement during the PRI era. Shannon O’Neil 
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states, “Law enforcement too, was used to control, rather than protect the population.”95 
Similarly, Sabet observes, “Some scholars contend that corruption, abuse, and 
ineffectiveness should not be surprising given that historically the police primarily 
existed to support the governing regime rather than to protect and serve the Mexican 
people.”96 Lastly, this phenomenon originates from a lack of training and historical 
inclinations more than spiteful attitude of law enforcement personnel. O’Neil expresses, 
“Most of Mexico’s various police forces continue to be largely incapable of objective and 
thorough investigations, having never received adequate resources or training.”97 That 
being said, proper training of law enforcement is and should be a crucial aspect of any 
anti-drug policy. Use of the military should only be used temporarily and in emergency 
situations when rule of law must be restored, because sustained use of the military results 
in militarization and the eventual demise of their reputation. 
A major problem that often occurs together with the imposition of strict anti-drug 
policies is increased militarization of the effort, with accompanying increases in human 
rights abuses. Gian Carlo Delgado-Ramos and Silvina María Romano discuss possible 
lessons learned from United States involvement in combating narco-terrorism in 
Colombia by stating, “As the Colombian case has shown and as is becoming evident in 
the Mexican one, this leads to authoritarian systems with increasing military and 
paramilitary power, human rights violations, and increased United States interference 
under the guise of help, cooperation, or the defense of its interests and investments in the 
region.”98 Furthermore, they go on to explain that United States involvement in 
Colombia only served to turn one country’s conflict into a regional problem, and that the 
United States “has sought to maintain bilateral economic and security relations in order to 
neutralize the possibility of a genuinely multilateral agenda.”99 James Petras concurs 
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with this point made by Delgado-Ramos and Romano; he states, “Rather than containing 
the civil conflict, Plan Colombia is extending and internationalising the war; exacerbating 
instability in the adjoining regions of neighbouring countries.”100 The points being made 
are that these countries are typically coerced by the United States into implementing 
these militarized approaches to fulfill their own agenda. Second, that the policies 
implemented often create separate issues like human rights violations or transferring the 
issues to neighboring countries. Arturo Sotomayor touches on all these points and takes 
them a step further. First, he emphasizes the point that Mexico adopted its military centric 
approach due to internal and external pressures.101 Second, he argues “that militarization 
increased human-rights abuses committed by troops, eroded civilian oversight, and 
undermined coordination efforts between security agencies.”102 Furthermore, that this 
approach in Mexico had spillover effects into Central American countries that are less 
capable of confronting these violent organizations than a country like Mexico.103 Lastly, 
both Sotomayor and Brian Bow argue that adopting a plan similar to Plan Colombia in 
Mexico is futile due to Plan Colombia’s inability to actually affect the drug market.104 As 
a result of this data, one can assert that militarization in Mexico will only result in an 
environment rich in human-rights abuses and further deteriorate civil-military relations. 
Equally important, this issue is one of the major contributing factors to the rise of DTOs 
in Mexico. A distrust in the rule of law and the expectation that reporting a crime to law 
enforcement will result in a not-guilty verdict or human-rights abuse. 
3. Political Corruption and DTOs 
This subsection will focus on the relationship between DTOs and the PRI 
government and how this contributed to the rise in prominence of the Mexican cartels and 
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the coinciding increase of violence in Mexico in the early 21st century prior to the 
implementation of the Mérida Initiative. However, it will also challenge this 
oversimplification of the issue, which is that the PRI is solely responsible for the levels of 
violence in Mexico, and that the PAN and PRD are not equally corrupt. While I do agree 
that the patron-client relationship between the PRI and DTOs is partially responsible for 
the outbreak in violence, the argument ignores two major factors: (1) That corruption 
hasn’t improved in Mexico following political plurality (2) That locations of increased 
violence are a result of historical drug routes and fractionalization and decentralization of 
cartels due to direct conflict with Mexican forces. This argument is important, because it 
puts holes in the argument that any political party is better suited for addressing the drug 
issue and that militarization is to blame for increased violence.  
Although the outbreak in violence appeared to be sudden, leaving observers to 
assume that drug trafficking was a contemporary issue; in reality, Mexico was supplying 
U.S. demand for much of the 20th century. One major difference was the opening in the 
Mexican political system in 2000.105 On this matter, Brian Bow observes “the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI’s) defeat in the 2000 elections shook the patron-
client relationships throughout the country, including those that connected national and 
local officials to drug-trafficking organizations.”106 Therefore, the relative peace that 
existed in Mexico for almost a century was merely the product of an unwritten 
understanding between the PRI government and the DTOs. Shannon O’Neil elaborates 
further by stating, “Through the Mexican Ministry of the Interior and the federal police, 
as well as governorships and other political offices, the government established patron-
client relationships with drug traffickers (just as it did with other sectors of the economy 
and society). This arrangement limited violence against public officials, top traffickers, 
and civilians; made sure that court investigations never reached the upper ranks of 
cartels; and defined the rules of the game for traffickers.”107 It was not only the 
relationship that DTOs and the Mexican government had that ended with the demise of 
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the PRI but also the strength of the presidency. O’Neil observes, “Democratic 
competition also hampered the state’s capacity to react forcefully. Mexico’s powerful 
presidency—the result of party cohesion rather than institutional design—ended. As 
Congress’ influence grew, legislative gridlock weakened President Fox’s hand, delaying 
judicial and police reforms.”108 Therefore, the opening of the political system revealed 
two things (1) the federal government was no longer going to turn a blind eye to drug 
trafficking (2) it revealed the weakness of the government’s ability to react forcefully to 
DTOs. Lastly, even after the Mexican government took a stand against drug trafficking, 
the protective legacy of the PRI remains:  
Today, a look at Mexico’s political map after the 2009 elections shows us 
that the trafficking corridors for cocaine and other drugs are concentrated 
in states still governed—in most cases without interruption—by the old 
ruling party [PRI]: the Pacific Coast (Oaxaca, Colima, Nayarit, and 
Sinaloa), the Yacatán peninsula (Campeche, Quintana Roo, and Yucatán), 
the Gulf states (Tabasco and Veracruz), and the better part of the northern 
border region (Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, and Coahuila).109 
Not only was the PRI a contributing factor for drug trafficking taking hold of 
Mexico, but they remain complicit with this activity as long as it suits their needs.  
Despite convincing arguments from scholars, the 2000 opening of the political 
system did not end corruption in Mexico and violence is more a factor of historic drug 
routes and fractionalization and decentralization of DTOs than ruling political parties in 
the region. First, if the PRI is solely responsible for corruption and complicity of the drug 
trade, then one would expect to see a drastic drop in corruption after the election of PRD 
and PAN officials (see Table 1).  
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Table 1. Mexico Corruption Index (1997–2010) 
 
Data from Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 1997–2010,” Transparency 
International, accessed May 07, 2016, http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2009/0/.  
 
However, this did not prove to be the case in Mexico. In fact, utilizing the data 
presented in the table, one can assert that overall presence of corruption in Mexico 
remained relatively unchanged between 1997 and 2010.110 Second, utilizing maps of 
cartel location and drug routes, one can assert that locations of violence are based off 
efficiency of narcotics transport—both ingress and egress—and the proximity to the 
United States and major U.S. cities where border crossings would be more likely (see 
Figure 1). If one were to rule out political parties and predict locations of high crime 
based off ingress of drugs and egress of drugs alone, one would expect high levels of 
violence on the Yucatán peninsula, the Gulf states, the Pacific Coast, and the northern 
border region, which matches Luis Astorga and David Shirk’s claims that it is due to non-
PRI rule.111 Third, the direct conflict approach that the Fox and Calderon administrations 
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implemented is at least partially responsible for the increased violence. In a report titled 
Drug Violence in Mexico, the authors write, “the militarized strategy pursued by 
President Calderón has only contributed to greater infighting within and among organized 
crime groups.”112 They go on to attribute the violence to the fractionalization of 
organized crime groups—not the concentration of political parties: 
Indeed, the data and analysis in this report illustrate that there has been a 
shift from “organized” to “disorganized” crime in Mexico, as conflicts 
among factions and splinter groups have escalated. The primary result, as 
noted in this report, is that violence in Mexico is becoming less 
geographically concentrated, is affecting a greater number of 
municipalities, and there is growing number of casualties in small and 
medium sized towns throughout the country.113  
This section emphasizes the point that drug trafficking and supplying U.S. 
demand was not unique to the turn of the 21st century. Furthermore, it establishes a client-
patron relationship between the PRI government and the DTOs, which were protected as 
long as the government benefited. Lastly, it seeks to prove that the PAN and PRD have 
done little to improve political corruption and that ruling parties are not that only factor 
for the rise in violence. However, this section does not deny the need for the Mexican 
Government to address political corruption. It hinders the political system, the criminal 
justice system, and the continued relationship between the United States and Mexico.114 
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Figure 1.  Drug Routes and Cartel Areas of Influence in Mexico (2015)115 
4. Conclusion 
This section analyzed the environment and historically weak Mexican institutions 
that aided in the rise of DTOs. More specifically, it analyzed the weak judicial system, 
which prohibits the ability to make arrests and prosecute in an efficient and corruption 
free manner. Next, it looked at the historical tendency of Mexican institutions to commit 
human rights abuses and the inherent danger of militarizing. Lastly, it looked at the long-
standing client-patron relationship of the PRI government and drug traffickers, and that 
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political corruption continues regardless of political party. Furthermore, it showed that 
scholars should focus less on political parties and more other factors that contribute to the 
rise in violence, which are historical drug routes and fractionalized DTOs. All of these 
factors contributed to the environment that favored DTOs to gain power, establish a 
stronghold within Mexico, and generate the high levels of violence that stimulated the 
Mérida Initiative. By understanding these factors, one can understand the importance of 
well-rounded anti-drug policy. 
C. BALLOON EFFECT AND THE MOVEMENT OF DRUG ROUTES 
 Other factors that contributed to Mexican cartels’ rise in prominence are anti-drug 
efforts in South and Central America and the subsequent balloon effect. As focus 
intensified on Colombia, the Caribbean, and other source or transit points, Mexican 
cartels were able and willing to accept increased responsibility in the drug trade. Shannon 
O’Neil writes, “In the 1980s and 1990s, the United States cracked down on drug transit 
through the Caribbean and Miami. As a result, more products started going through 
Mexico and over the U.S.-Mexican border. In 1991, 50 percent of U.S.-bound cocaine 
came through Mexico; by 2004, 90 percent of U.S.-bound cocaine (and large percentages 
of other drugs) did.”116 Furthermore, Luis Astorga and David Shirk state, “As Colombian 
DTOs fractionalized and imploded in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mexico emerged as 
the hub of drug trafficking into the U.S. market, with Mexican DTOs increasingly 
controlling both the forward and backward linkages.”117 Lastly, the Organization of 
American States recognize the cocaine production in Colombia was due to anti-drug 
efforts in Bolivia and Peru and the subsequent shift of drug routes from the Caribbean to 
Mexico was from interdiction efforts.118 Therefore, based off these comments from 
scholars, one can assert that our anti-drug efforts stemming from Plan Colombia were at 
least partially responsible for the rising role of Mexican cartels in the trafficking of illicit 
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drugs into the United States. Furthermore, that the United States is at least partially 
responsible for bringing the war on drugs to its border. Beyond being a cause for this 
shift in operation, scholars have criticized policy makers for adopting similar military-
centric policies that led to this balloon effect in the first place. One of the reasons for 
these criticisms is the lack of focus on the root causes of the illicit drug market, one of 
which will be discussed in the subsequent section (Results of Weak Gun Legislation in 
the United States).119 For example, Sabrina Abu-Hamdeh comments, “A military-
centered aid approach is not working. Plan Colombia showed that the United States could 
eradicate cartel influence in one country, but that the drug trade would merely shift to a 
new country.”120 Additionally, Astorga and Shirk observe “at best, troop deployments 
appeared to merely displace the violence, perpetuating the so-called ‘balloon effect’ that 
has manifested throughout the history of drug control efforts.”121 It is fairly safe to 
assume based off this research that troop deployments have resulted in more than 
eradication of illicit substances by merely displacing the operations. Beyond being a case 
for the shift in drug routes, scholars question the effectiveness of increasing interdiction 
efforts and the corresponding finances that go with it. In a RAND corporation report 
titled, The U.S. Drug Policy Landscape: Insights and Opportunities for Improving the 
View, the authors discuss the high cost and minimal results the come from interdiction: 
Accounting for expenditures on interdiction is complicated, since many 
interdiction assets serve multiple functions, not just drug control, but 
interdiction is credited with 15 percent of federal drug control spending in 
2012. While a large percentage of cocaine shipments are seized (the UN 
claims as much as 40 percent of the total quantity) and interdiction 
succeeds in maintaining a startlingly large price differential between 
wholesale prices in the United States and abroad, there is little evidence 
that the increased efforts have done more than shift the methods and routes 
by which the drugs are shipped.122 
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That being said, one must question the results of anti-drug policies beyond whether it 
accomplished its immediate mission. If disrupting the drug routes in the Caribbean was 
the overall mission, then it was a success. However, if disrupting overall drug routes and 
lowering the amount of cocaine flowing in the United States was the mission, then closer 
examination must be given to the results of interdiction efforts. 
 This section continues to address one of the overall questions for this chapter, 
what factors led to an increased role of Mexican DTOs in the illicit drug trade? Based off 
the research and evidence presented by scholars, the shift in drug routes was a major 
contributing factor the rise in influence of DTOs in Mexico. The environment was right 
in Mexico to allow for the DTOs to thrive, but the shift in cocaine trafficking routes was 
necessary to give Mexican DTOs the impetus (primarily monetary) necessary to get 
involved in the cocaine drug trade. Weak institutions and corruption only paint part of the 
picture. However, in order to protect their new found business, DTOs would need the 
firepower necessary to fight back against the Mexican government—this would come 
from weak gun legislation in the United States. 
D. RESULTS OF WEAK GUN LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Among all the factors that we have discussed, most are a result of historical trends 
in Mexico and can be directly affected by decisions made by the Mexican government 
and people. The next factor that contributed to a conducive environment for DTOs and 
violence in Mexico is a result of U.S. legislation. More specifically, weak gun laws, 
which enable Mexican DTOs to arm themselves and challenge the Mexican government 
for security supremacy. One of the major controversies surrounding U.S. anti-drug policy 
is the unwillingness of the United States to address domestic issues contributing to the 
violence and continued drug operations in source and transit countries. This section of the 
paper will focus on gun legislation and how it can contribute to the “shared 
responsibility” approach of the Mérida Initiative. In order to conduct this assessment, this 
section will examine scholarly assessments as well as supporting statistics. 
As far as gun control is concerned, Brewer writes, “The Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) estimates that 90–95% of Mexican cartels’ weapons enter 
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Mexico from the southern United States, where individual buyers, benefiting from gaping 
loopholes in U.S. gun laws, purchase multiple weapons from gun sellers and then pass 
the weapons to drug cartels.”123 Beyond weak gun laws in the United States, the ATF has 
had issues of their own. An ATF operation known as “Fast and Furious,” in which guns 
were intentionally let across the border in order to track, the ATF lost track of over a 
thousand of these guns.124 Lastly, issues exist between Mexican and U.S. cooperation in 
addressing this issue. Mexican authorities do not have access to U.S. gun registration 
databases, which adds additional restrictions when attempting to trace confiscated 
weapons.125 This is an issue that both Mexico and the United States have attempted to 
address both in the past and present. The danger that goes along with this issue is that 
Mexican officials are becoming outgunned and are out trained on the use of firearms.126 
The top two most popular firearms for Mexican DTOs are the AK-47 type semi-
automatic rifle (7.62x39mm caliber) and the AR-15 semi-automatic rifle clones (.223 
caliber), while most local and state police (90 percent of country’s law enforcement 
personnel) are armed with a revolver and a few rounds of ammunition.127 The danger of 
the heavily armed DTOs and the poorly armed and trained state and municipal police is 
the ability for the state to maintain a monopoly of security and power in all areas:  
While DTOs still use firearms to establish control over drug trafficking 
routes leading to the United States, in the last few years they more 
regularly use firearms in open combat with rival DTOs, Mexican 
authorities, and the public. Such open confrontations with the Mexican 
state indicate a move “into a sphere that is typically inhabited by groups 
with a much more overt political stance, such as terrorists, guerillas or 
paramilitaries.” Mexican DTOs are also demanding more sophisticated 
firearms and larger quantities of arms and ammunition. The resulting 
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murder rate is now seven times what it was at the beginning of the decade, 
and Mexico’s democratic governance is at serious risk.128 
This quotation from an article titled, “U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico: New 
Data and Insights Illuminate Key Trends and Challenges,” embodies the challenges being 
faced by the Mexican and U.S. governments in the war on drugs. The idea of a failed 
state will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent sections, but the danger to the 
both countries (United States and Mexico) is expressed in a 2008 CRS report in which 
the author states, “These threats include providing safe havens for terrorists, organized 
crime, and other illicit groups; causing conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian 
emergencies; and undermining efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and 
economic sustainability.”129 The threat that illegal firearms trafficking poses to both 
countries is undeniable and must be addressed by the United States in order to maintain 
stability and security in Mexico. Weak gun legislation is one of the major contributing 
factors to the rise of power and influence of Mexican DTOs. 
This section focused on another one of the factors that contributed to the growing 
threat of DTOs in Mexico. Weak gun legislation and control of firearms in the United 
States allowed firearms to flow in massive numbers south across the border and into the 
hands of DTOs. Due to the fact that they favored heavy firepower, it gave them the 
capability to gain power over the local and state law enforcement, and left Mexico no 
other choice but to utilize federal police and military to take back certain municipalities. 
With such high levels of violence and seemingly unassailable DTOs, it left many to 
question whether Mexico was a failing state. 
E. MEXICO AS A FAILED STATE? 
As alluded to in the introduction, the failed state debate has become prevalent in 
discussions concerning Mexico’s struggle with DTOs. Considering Mexico a failed state 
is essentially placing it on the same playing field as countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
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and Iraq, which all fall under “high alert” on the Fragile States Index.130 In fact, policy 
makers and high-ranking members of the military have compared Mexico to Pakistan in 
the past. According to Shannon O’Neil, “The U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint 
Operating Environment, 2008 paired Mexico with Pakistan in its discussion of ‘worst 
case scenarios’ −states susceptible to ‘a rapid and sudden collapse.’”131 Furthermore, in 
2008, former SOUTHCOM Commander and White House Drug Czar Gen. Barry 
McCaffrey used similar language to describe Mexico by saying, they were “on the road 
to becoming a failed state,” and were “on the edge of the abyss—it [Mexico] could 
become a narco-state in the upcoming decade.”132 Lastly, in September 2010, “Secretary 
of State Hilary Clinton would tell reporters…that Mexico was looking ‘more and more 
like Colombia looked twenty years ago’ and that Mexican DTOs were ‘morphing into 
what we would consider an insurgency.’”133 However, these claims seem to serve more 
as a political speech tool than a true understanding of the problem at hand or the 
definition of a failed state for that matter. Politicians use this language to gain support 
from voters and tax payers and pass legislation that often has a cost associated with it. In 
the same time frame that these statements were being made, the CRS published a report 
concerning weak and failing states—not one data point (2007 World Bank, 2007 U.S. 
Department of State Foreign Assistance Framework, 2007 George Mason University 
Researchers’ State Fragility Index, 2007 Fund for Peace Failed States Index, 2008 
Brookings Institution Index of State Weakness in the Developing World) they utilized 
had Mexico in danger of failing.134 In fact, the entire report does not even mention 
Mexico.  
This section of the paper will address the following question—was Mexico in 
danger of becoming a failed state? In order to answer this question, one must look at 
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arguments presented by scholars and the facts to support their claims. By understanding 
this debate, one can address whether U.S. policy makers were properly informed prior to 
implementing anti-drug policy in Mexico or if they utilized data to implement their 
policies. Furthermore, whether the policies they were implementing are appropriate for 
the challenges in Mexico. 
One of the first data points to examine when discussing failed states is the Fragile 
States Index, which is published annually by The Fund for Peace. The Fragile States 
Index gives each country an overall score based off twelve assessment criteria; the higher 
the score (between 1 and 10), the more in danger the country is of being labeled a failed 
or fragile state.135 However, the website does not actually label countries failed or fragile, 
but instead uses terms like sustainable or very sustainable to label thriving countries and 
terms like high alert or very high alert to label countries with the highest turmoil.136 To 
put these terms and numbers into perspective, in 2008 when Mexico was being grouped 
with Pakistan for its potential to become a failing state, Pakistan was the 9th worst 
country with an overall score of 103.8, while Mexico was the 105th on the list of 177, had 
a score of 72.2, and was labeled a warning state.137 Mexico stayed fairly consistent in its 
scoring on the failed/fragile states index (see Table 2) over the following years, and they 
tended to struggle with uneven development, which Laurie Freeman and Jorge Luis 
Sierra state “Mexico’s impressive economic growth since the mid-1980s has not 
benefited the majority of Mexicans,” and security apparatus, which attests to the outbreak 
of violence.138 These statistics provide a partial understanding of the failed state debate, 
but one must also take into account the testimony of scholars. 
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2006 73.1 7.2 4.3 6.1 7.0 8.3 6.3 5.9 6.0 5.1 6.0 4.7 6.2 
2007 72.6 6.9 4.0 6.1 7.0 8.4 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.1 6.1 4.8 6.2 
2008 72.2 7.0 4.0 5.8 7.0 8.4 6.0 6.1 5.7 5.1 5.8 4.8 6.5 
2009 75.4 7.0 4.3 5.9 7.0 8.2 6.1 6.8 6.0 5.5 7.0 5.0 6.6 
2010 76.1 6.8 4.1 5.8 6.8 8.0 6.5 6.6 5.8 5.8 7.5 5.5 6.9 
2011 75.1 6.5 4.2 6.1 6.5 7.7 6.0 6.6 5.8 5.9 7.9 5.2 6.7 
2012 73.6 6.0 4.2 5.8 6.2 7.5 5.7 6.6 6.1 6.2 7.7 5.2 6.4 
2013 73.1 6.5 4.0 6.1 5.9 7.2 5.2 6.1 6.6 6.3 7.9 5.2 6.1 
2014 71.1 6.7 4.3 6.1 5.6 6.9 4.9 5.8 6.3 6.0 7.6 5.1 5.8 
Data from The Fund for Peace, “Fragile/Failed States Index 2006–2014,” The Fund for Peace, 
accessed July 10, 2014, http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2014. 
 
Most scholars differ drastically from politicians when discussing the probability 
of Mexico becoming a failed state. For instance, O’Neil writes, “The question is not 
whether the Mexican state will fail. It will not. The Mexican state does, and will continue 
to, collect taxes, run schools, repair roads, pay salaries, and manage large social programs 
throughout the country. The civilian-controlled military has already extinguished any real 
guerilla threats. The government regularly holds free and fair elections, and its 
legitimacy, in the eyes of its citizens and of the world, is not questioned.”139 
Furthermore, Paul Kenny and Monica Serrano dismiss the notion of Mexico being a 
failed state, and view the issue as a “security failure.”  Even to say that Mexico has an 
unprecedented homicide issue is far-fetched. Astorga and Shirk observe, “By 
comparison, a recent study by Fernando Escalante examined homicide rates in Mexico, 
Colombia, and the United States between 1990 and 2007, and found that ‘the problem of 
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homicide in Mexico is much more similar to that of the United States than that of 
Colombia.’”  Lastly, in a report titled Drug Violence in Mexico, the authors state, 
“Discussions about violence in Mexico often raise concerns about the limits of state 
capacity, but the characterization of Mexico as a failed state greatly exaggerates the 
extent to which organized crime groups have effectively supplanted the state. While there 
are a significant number of ‘captured spaces’ in Mexico, these are primarily found in 
relatively isolated, rural areas. Moreover, when proper force is applied, such spaces have 
been restored to full government control.”140 Therefore, how policy makers and scholars 
view this issue in Mexico is drastically different and can explain the rhetoric of the 
Mérida Initiative and related anti-drug policies. 
In conclusion, this section examined the possibility of Mexico becoming a failed 
state, and despite politician’s assumptions that Mexico would join the ranks of countries 
like Pakistan, scholarly assessments indicate that Mexico is far from having this happen. 
The reason this is important is that it shows Mexico has the ability to overcome DTOs if 
the previously discussed issues are addressed. Furthermore, it shows that Mexico is in 
fact far better off than countries like Colombia were, because it has better resources to 
address drug trafficking. If dealt with properly, the issues in Mexico can be overcome, 
and they can prove to be a major anti-drug ally with the United States in the war on 
drugs. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide background information of the “war 
on drugs” to better understand the challenges of the Mérida Initiative. The questions 
presented at the beginning of this chapter were: what factors led to an increased role of 
Mexican DTOs in the illicit drug trade, what generated the outbreak of violence in 
Mexico, and does Mexico have the capacity to win the war on drugs, with or without 
support from the United States? Based on the research and the facts provided in this 
chapter, one can identify multiple sources of the violence in Mexico. First, weak 
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government institutions contribute to the ability of DTOs to commit and get away with 
their crimes. Furthermore, widespread corruption allows DTOs to buy off law 
enforcement personnel responsible for prosecuting them. Second, historical human-rights 
abuses deteriorate relationships between civilians and government officials, making the 
likelihood of reporting drug trafficking less likely. Third, DTOs established a patron-
client relationship with the PRI government, and their defeat in 2000 triggered the 
outbreak of violence, which has not improved under other political parties. Fourth, 
United States efforts in South and Central America and the Caribbean have created a 
movement of transit routes, which resulted in the majority of cocaine transiting across the 
U.S./Mexico border. Fifth, weak gun control legislation further weakens Mexico’s fight 
against DTOs. Finally, Mexico is not a failed, failing, or weak state, and with proper 
resources has the ability to overcome DTOs and reclaim a security monopoly over its 
territories. The Mexican people have the capacity to combat DTOs and this is another 
reason why they should not be treated like Colombia, Afghanistan, or Iraq. The Mérida 
Initiative should be what it set out to be—a shared responsibility. The next chapter will 
focus exactly on that by analyzing the goals of the Mérida Initiative from its inception 
and the funding that coincided with those goals. 
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III. MÉRIDA INITIATIVE CONCEPTION AND FUNDING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in 2006, he made combating 
DTOs and organized crime a priority.141 In October 2007, following President Calderón’s 
request for aid in Mérida, Mexico, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida 
Initiative, a bilateral effort focused on shared responsibility to combat drug trafficking 
and organized crime.142 This chapter will focus on the goals of the Mérida Initiative as 
well as analyze the allocation of resources, which includes funds, equipment, and 
training, and their role in accomplishing these goals over the last nine years. In order to 
accomplish this, this chapter will be structured into four sections. The first section will 
discuss the goals of the Mérida Initiative and how they have evolved over time and across 
administrations. The second section will provide a detailed comparison between Mexico 
and Colombia in order to understand the fundamental differences between the Mérida 
Initiative and Plan Colombia, and whether a policy similar to Plan Colombia would be 
effective in Mexico. The final section will analyze the allocation of resources, which 
includes funding, both appropriated and allocated, equipment, and training. The overall 
question this chapter will try to answer is, did the resources of the Mérida Initiative 
address the underlying issues?   
B. GOALS OF THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 
The original goals set forth in the Mérida Initiative were “(1) break the power and 
impunity of criminal organizations; (2) strengthen border, air, and maritime controls; (3) 
improve the capacity of justice systems in the region; and (4) curtail gang activity and 
diminish local drug demand.”143 The Bush Administration set forth these goals, but 
eventually the focus shifted slightly under the Obama Administration. A 2014 
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Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report stated, “Acknowledging that Mexico 
cannot effectively confront organized crime with tactical victories alone, in March 2010, 
the Obama Administration and the Mexican government agreed to a new strategic 
framework for security cooperation under the Mérida Initiative.”144 These new goals 
were intended to address the weak government institutions and societal problems that 
sanctioned the drug trade rather than focusing on the security aspect as originally 
intended.145 The new four pillar strategy is as follows: “(1) Disrupting the operational 
capacity of organized criminal groups (2) Institutionalizing reforms to sustain the rule of 
law and respect for human rights (3) Creating a 21st century border (4) Building strong 
and resilient communities.”146 This section will focus on these four contemporary goals 
of the policy, and how they intended to address the drug trade in Mexico. By 
understanding the goals, one can better understand the importance of applicable resource 
allocation. 
1. Disrupting the Operational Capacity of Organized Criminal Groups 
The first pillar of the strategy is disrupting the operational capacity of organized 
criminal groups. A report from the United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) describes this pillar as “increasing coordination and information sharing to fight 
drug trafficking organizations (DTO) by focusing on intelligence collection and analysis, 
training and equipping special units, enhancing police and prosecutors’ investigative 
capacity, conducting targeted investigations against money laundering, improving 
interdiction capability, and by supporting effective command and control centers across 
Mexico.”147 The major shift in this area compared to the Bush administration is less focus 
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on equipping and more on training and intelligence collection.148 According to a CRS 
report, “During the Calderón Administration, Mexico focused much of its efforts on 
dismantling the leadership of the DTOs. U.S. assistance appropriated during the first 
phase of the Mérida Initiative (FY2008-FY2010) enabled the purchase of equipment to 
support the efforts of federal security forces engaged in anti-DTO efforts.”149 This focus 
shifted in part due to the ability of DTOs to adapt to tactics used by United States and 
Mexican officials; brute force was no longer the best way to address DTOs, and security 
forces would have to rely on better training and intelligence.150 Furthermore, the Mexican 
government began to focus attention on hitting DTOs where it really mattered—their 
profits. However, one of the side effects of this strategy was transforming DTOs that 
were focused primarily on trafficking operations into poly-criminal organizations 
involved in other crimes, such as kidnapping and alien smuggling.151 
2. Institutionalizing Reforms to Sustain the Rule of Law and Respect for 
Human Rights in Mexico 
 The second pillar of the Mérida Initiative was focused on the criminal justice 
system and historically bad records of human rights violations.152 The 2014 CRS Report 
cites, “Due to concerns about the corruption and ineffectiveness of police and 
prosecutors, less than 13% of all crimes are reported in Mexico.”153 Shannon O’Neil 
writes extensively about these issues in Mexico. In a paper titled, “The Real War in 
Mexico: How Democracy Can Defeat the Drug Cartels,” she labels corruption Mexico’s 
Achilles’ heel.154 She goes on to observe that the police force never received the 
necessary resources to conduct objective and thorough investigations and that “the 
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chance of being prosecuted, much less convicted, of a crime is extremely low.”155 Policy 
makers clearly recognized this issue as well, and they made changing the trend a major 
goal in the Mérida Initiative. Affecting this issue in Mexico would require a two-tier 
approach; one focus would be on reforming the police, and the other on reforming the 
judicial and penal system.156 According to Eric Olson and Christopher Wilson, “Civilian 
institutions, not the military, are ultimately responsible for serving justice and 
maintaining the rule of law.”157 One of the major issues with relying on the military to 
perform law enforcement operations is their legal inability to “collect evidence and 
interrogate suspects.”158 Therefore, Mexico and the U.S. were forced to come up with a 
long-term solution and strengthen the civilian institutions that are responsible for these 
actions. Lastly, Hal Brands writes, “The Mexican army has a sorry history of human right 
abuses, symbolized by the Tlatelolco massacre of 1968.”159 From late 2006 to 2009, 
there have been more than 600 human rights violations, which emphasizes the 
importance addressing this issue and avoiding tackling the drug problem in Mexico with 
an equally disturbing infringement on the citizens basic rights.160 
3. Building a 21st Century Border 
 The third pillar in the Mérida Initiative was focused on the border. According to 
Olson and Wilson, “The challenge is to prevent the flows of illicit goods and dangerous 
individuals while allowing legitimate commerce and travel to occur freely.”161 Due to the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the heavy flow of commerce 
across this border, shutting it down completely is not an option. Instead, Mexico and the 
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U.S. must rely on technology and proper training to maintain safety and efficiency at the 
border.162 In their comments about the 21st century border, the CRS make the following 
five observations for its inception: “(1) enhancing public safety via increased information 
sharing, screenings, and prosecutions; (2) securing the cross-border flow of goods and 
people; (3) expediting legitimate commerce and travel through investments in personnel, 
technology, and infrastructure; (4) engaging border communities in cross-border trade; 
and (5) setting bilateral policies for collaborative border management.”163 Sabrina Abu-
Hamdeh also describes this pillar as “changing the definition of a border from a simple 
geographic delineation to one of ‘secure flows.’ This would entail moving the location of 
customs and security away from the border to a central city and leaving the border as 
merely a place to ‘focus on preventing the entrance of dangerous illicit flows.’”164 The 
overall goal of this pillar is to keep commerce flowing and effectively screen both 
northbound and southbound traffic for illicit goods. Shannon O’Neil understands the 
fiscal implications of modernizing the U.S./Mexico border. In 2013, in a prepared 
statement to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Global Narcotics Affairs, 
O’Neil states, “The estimated cost of these necessary investments would also be 
relatively small, with the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol estimating the need for some 
$6 billion over the next decade.”165 This area of focus plays an important role in the 
mutual benefits between both countries and the continued trade success following the 
implementation of NAFTA. Furthermore, this monetary commitment seems practical 
considering the U.S. spent over $8 billion as part of Plan Colombia between FY2000 and 
2009.166  
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4. Building Strong and Resilient Communities 
 The final pillar of the Mérida Initiative was focused on social economic reforms 
that would create jobs and in return deter involvement in illicit activities.167 Olson and 
Wilson state, “This final pillar takes into consideration that the sources, or drivers, of 
violence cannot be understood or addressed solely with a security and law enforcement 
based approach. Social and economic factors also play an important role.”168 This final 
pillar is directed at strengthening the communities and giving children and adults the 
opportunity to operate in legal parameters and not feel the desperation to work for DTOs. 
According to Hal Brands, “Despite relatively strong macroeconomic growth over the past 
15 years, roughly 40 percent of Mexico’s population lives in poverty, with 18 percent 
living in extreme poverty.”169 Furthermore, this pillar was in response to criticisms about 
the military centric approach and was meant to reduce criminality, tackle social problems, 
and improve citizen-government relations; this strategy became known as “Todos Somos 
Juarez,” which translates to “We are All Juárez” and refers to the high levels of cartel 
violence in Cuidad Juárez.170 According the CRS, this pillar was a top priority for the 
Peña Nieto administration through which he implemented Mexico’s National Crime and 
Violence Prevention Program.171  
5. Summary 
 The aforementioned pillars of the Mérida Initiative will serve as guidance 
throughout this chapter, which will provide a comparison of Mexico and Colombia and 
focus on resource allocation of the Mérida Initiative. By understanding these pillars and 
their role in policy formation and funding allocation, and comparing them with the 
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underlying issues presented in previous chapters, one can truly understand where the 
focus is and whether it is properly addressing the issues.  
C. PLAN COLOMBIA VS. MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 
One of the important aspects to analyze when discussing anti-drug policy is a 
comparison with other similar policies. As discussed previously, one of the criticisms that 
U.S. funding for the Mérida Initiative acquired in the last few years was the timeliness of 
fund allocation.172 Therefore, one would expect the majority of anti-drug funding in 
Mexico to come from the United States; however, this is not the case and varies greatly 
from Plan Colombia. According to a 2015 CRS Report, $2.5 billion has been 
appropriated for Mérida Initiative, which appears to be a decent amount compared to the 
over $8 billion spent in Colombia between FY2000 and FY2009.173 However, this 
amount of funding is insignificant in comparison to the $79 billion spent by Mexico on 
security and public safety over the same time frame.174 That being said, one cannot 
expect the timeliness of funds from the U.S. Government to have a major effect on the 
success of anti-drug policy in Mexico. What is more important is the training that was 
provided by U.S. troops in successfully combating the DTOs and to provide intelligence 
and equipment. Conversely, Colombia did not have nearly the assets that Mexico did to 
combat narcotics and narco-guerilla groups. In fact, in 2000 when funding for Plan 
Colombia began, Colombia’s GDP was $99.9 billion, and in 2008 when funding for the 
Mérida Initiative began, Mexico’s GDP was $1.1 trillion.175 That is about 11 times more 
GDP in Mexico than Colombia, which shows that funding timeliness was much more of a 
necessity in Colombia than Mexico; because it was significantly more, and it played a 
larger role in the success of combating narco-guerilla groups. 
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That being said, the Mérida Initiative should gather less focus and criticism on the 
timeliness of the money being allocated and spent and more focus on training, the use of 
funds, and the idea of “shared responsibility” between the two countries. In a 2015 CRS 
Report, the authors write, “One basic measure by which Congress has evaluated the 
Mérida Initiative has been the pace of equipment deliveries and training 
opportunities.”176 They go on to say, “It is unclear, though, whether more expeditious 
equipment deliveries to Mexico have resulted in a more positive evaluation of 
Mérida.”177  
Organized crime played a major role in the evolution of society throughout much 
of modern history. One could argue that this is particularly true in Colombia and Mexico, 
where criminal organizations related to banditry and illegal narcotics has been influential 
in the state building process. In his article titled, “Plan Colombia and the Mérida 
Initiative: Policy Twins or Distant Cousins?” John Bailey discusses various differences 
between Mexico and Colombia, which includes geographical size, population, economic 
capacity, government and judicial systems, law enforcement, and proximity to the US, 
which have all impacted their approach to coping with organized crime throughout the 
last few decades.178 In addition to this list, Francisco E. Thoumi asserts, “Mexican 
geography offers much greater possibilities for central government control” than 
Colombia179 Despite the various differences, he also points out that the central 
governments in both countries have difficulty controlling large areas of the countries, and 
local governments are often involved with or tolerate organized crime.180 This section 
will focus on the following questions: How has the evolution of state organizations in 
Colombia and Mexico affected the creation of organized crime groups? Furthermore, 
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how did the states react to these organized crime groups over time, and what led to these 
reactions? To answer these questions, this section will analyze and compare the 
economic, political, and social factors in Mexico and Colombia that led to the creation of 
organized crime groups. Then it will analyze the reactions of the government as well as 
the motivating factors for their reactions. 
1. Economic Factors 
Economic factors in both Mexico and Colombia provided a stimulus for the 
formation of OC. First, this section will discuss the economic factors that led to organized 
crime in Colombia then shift focus to Mexico. In his discussion of economic factors 
contributing to organized crime, Thoumi states, “In the twentieth century, as the country 
[Colombia] modernized, crime also developed: smuggling organizations flourished with 
the incentives provided by very high tariffs and other strong policies to protect 
industry.”181 Not only did these groups flourish as a result of government policies, but 
also they were stimulated by the strong demand and high profits of the drug market. 
Organized crime groups’ role in the drug industry began in the 1950s, supporting Cubans 
in Florida with the cocaine trade, transitioned to the trafficking of marijuana, and 
eventually evolved into control of the cocaine industry, which provided substantial 
financial stimulus for all parties involved—including the Colombian government. During 
the “Marijuana Boom,” the Colombian government “helped to institutionalize money 
laundering, enabling contraband importers and exporters to carry on their illegal business; 
this service would later be extended as well to cocaine dealers.”182  The government of 
Colombia provided the economic support for the creation of organized crime, but the 
United States provided the stimulus. Andres Restrepo and Alvaro Guizado comment on 
the ideal timing of their entry into the cocaine trade at the height of U.S. demand, which 
resulted in “enormous earnings.”183 In summary, the Colombian government made 
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organized crime convenient through their policies, and U.S. demand for illicit drugs made 
organized crime a profitable and appealing career choice. 
In Mexico, economic stagnation and inequality has created the economic 
incentive for banditry and organized crime.184 This began after Mexico’s independence in 
1821, and continued throughout much of the next century. In his work titled, Bandit 
Nation: A History of Outlaws and Cultural Struggle in Mexico, 1810–1920, Chris Frazer 
asserts that economic stagnation is one of multiple factors that fostered banditry in 
postcolonial reconstruction of Mexico, and the modernization during the Porfiriato 
created rural and urban impoverishment and economic inequality that continued to 
stimulate banditry among the lower classes.185 Luis Astorga presents the incentives for 
lower classes involvement in the illicit market by stating, “there can be multiple reasons 
for engaging in it. These may range from deeming illegal drug trade to be an economic 
activity like any other to viewing it as a means for survival or a full-time profession, thus 
making it worthwhile to risk one’s freedom or even one’s life.”186 Similar to Colombia, 
there is no denying the role that U.S. demand plays in the drug trade, which produces $65 
billion per year.187 In a country with economic inequality, the incentive to earn money is 
adequate for individuals to assume the risks involved. Furthermore, Bruce Bagley of the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars asserts that profits from cocaine are 
partially responsible for the rise in violence in Mexico as organized crime groups 
attempted to dominate key trafficking routes.188 To summarize, the Mexican economy, 
which was in shambles following independence, made banditry appealing to the lower 
classes. Although the economy eventually recovered, economic inequality continued and 
the profits of illicit markets stimulated organized crime in Mexico. 
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Various economic factors have accounted for the rise in organized crime in 
Colombia and Mexico. One of the differences between these countries is the role of the 
government in providing economic incentives for organized crime. The Colombian 
government inadvertently implemented policies that allowed for the formation of 
organized crime and their involvement in the illicit drug trade. The Mexican government 
viewed the lower class and banditry as an obstacle in achieving modernization, and 
attempted to thwart this pandemic. One of the key economic similarities, and something 
this section will consistently analyze, is the role of external factors—specifically the 
United States. Concerning economic factors, the demand of drugs from the U.S. played a 
major role in the formation of organized crime groups in both Colombia and Mexico. 
Economic factors provide a partial understanding of the formation and evolution of 
organized crime groups, but one must also focus on the politics in these two countries. 
2. Political Factors 
Political factors played a major role in the formation of organized crime groups in 
both Colombia and Mexico. In both of these countries this involved considerable 
acceptance of organized crime groups, patron-client relationships, and organized crime’s 
involvement in politics. This section will first discuss the role of politics in Colombia 
then shift focus to Mexico. At the start of the cocaine industry in Colombia, the 
government was lenient on the cocaine producers and even allowed potential buyers and 
traffickers into the country.189 On this topic, Restrepo and Guizado state, “It was a lot 
easier for them to traffic cocaine in Colombia than in the extremely tense and paranoid 
atmosphere of Bolivia and Peru.”190 The weak government and their complicit role in the 
cocaine trade fostered a shift in the cocaine industry from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia, 
and the rise of organized crime groups in Colombia.191 A negative opinion of the 
Colombian government concerning their involvement in the cocaine trade continued for 
years. Government officials were often caught or suspected of accepting money from 
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drug cartels, and this couldn’t be worse than when President Samper took money from 
the Cali cartel for his presidential campaign in 1994.192 Concerning the role of narcotics 
in the Colombian political system, Restrepo and Guizado write, “The retiring local head 
of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, in a farewell interview published in the press, 
referred to Colombia as a ‘narco-democracy.’”193 One of the major political factors 
leading to the formation of organized crime groups in Colombia was the battle between 
liberal and conservative political parties in capturing land from opponents—this was 
known as LaViolencia.194 On this topic, Thoumi states, “Land ownership has always been 
a main status symbol in the country and the weak and frequently undefined and 
questionable rural property rights have encouraged the formation of organized crime like 
groups.”195 Furthermore, paramilitary groups have continuously been associated with 
“both state institutions and to specific political parties.”196 He goes on to state, “The links 
between paramilitary and politicians have become clearer and the evidence of their 
strength is overwhelming: about 90 congressmen and women have been indicted with 
various charges of participating in paramilitary activities, receiving funding or working 
with those groups.”197 In summary, Colombian politics played a major role in the 
formation of organized crime groups in Colombia. First, the weakness and complicities of 
the government made Colombia’s role in the drug trade more prevalent after crackdowns 
in Peru and Bolivia. Second, political land grabs of the 1940s and 50s known as 
LaViolencia, created the political environment for the formation of organized crime 
groups.  
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Mexico has had a long-standing government relationship with organized crime 
groups, which began as banditry in the early 1800s.198 Luis Astorga discusses these 
relationships utilizing the example of Colonel Cantú, Governor of Baja California in the 
1910s and 20s. He states that Cantú “was a pioneer of the tradition between revolutionary 
politicians and those who succeeded them of conducting private business from public 
office, regardless of moral considerations and the illegal nature of the activities.”199 This 
direct relationship between politicians and organized crime groups continued over time in 
Mexico, especially in the Northern States. This involved casinos in Tijuana during U.S. 
alcohol prohibition, opium poppy cultivation financed by “Bugsy” Siegel and Virginia 
Hill in northwestern Mexico, and Mexican Department of Health Inspector Juan Requena 
observed, “that many of the narcotics traffickers in Cuidad Juárez ‘have or had the 
support of civilian and federal authorities.”200 With the rise of the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) in the 1920s and their long-term domination of the Mexican political 
system, came an “almost tributary relations with organized crime groups.”201 That being 
said, the political system in Mexico not only permitted organized crime groups in Mexico 
to gain control, they allowed them to thrive as a means of collecting revenue. Thoumi 
observes, “A weak central state, coupled with powerful local caudillos including state 
governors, used corruption as an instrument to exert control over the country’s 
territory.”202 Lastly, Astorga discusses the role that the Federal Directorate of Security 
(DFS) in protecting criminal groups and suppressing political opposition of the PRI.203 
Unlike in Colombia, where the geography and infrastructure made it difficult for the 
government to assert control over its territory, it appears in Mexico that the control was in 
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the hands of local political elites, and that they formed symbiotic relationships with 
organized criminal groups. 
3. Social Factors 
Colombia has various social factors that have contributed to the creation and 
evolution of organized crime. First, although the geography is not specifically social in 
nature, it has contributed to the creation of social factors. Thoumi asserts, “the Colombian 
central state has never controlled the country’s territory and it has not been capable of 
formulating a national project that would allow the establishment of the rule of law.”204 
As a result of this, the population has developed strong local identities; has “very low 
levels of trust, solidarity, reciprocity and empathy;” and a large portion of the population 
accept illegal behaviors.205 This socially acceptable view of illegal activities did shift 
slightly once guerilla groups and paramilitary groups began combatting each other. 
Thoumi writes, “They [guerilla and paramilitary groups] gained military power but lost 
public support as they became increasingly akin to OC [organized crime].”206 Lastly, 
early in the drug trade, it was difficult to regulate the flow of drugs in Colombia, because 
prominent members of society used drugs regularly.207 It was therefore difficult to 
prosecute them or get traction for regulating the trade—it was socially accepted among 
Colombian society.208 
Like Colombia, Mexico underwent a similar discourse in the development of 
organized crime as a result of social factors. After the war for independence, banditry 
became socially accepted and often exploited by political parties. A belief existed that the 
lower classes were inclined to commit these illegal activities, and that it was the job of 
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the elites to “revive the colonial spirit of respect for authority.”209 Chris Frazer discusses 
the phenomenon in further detail by stating, “the war for independence had inculcated a 
spirit of disobedience and rebellion among significant portions of the lower classes, and 
this clearly animated their reaction to the economic crisis.”210 Essentially banditry 
became socially acceptable among the lower classes as a means of survival, while the 
upper classes accepted the fact that the lower classes were prone to these activities—even 
though they did not approve. As discussed previously, the elites, who were battling for 
control over the country, exploited the urban and rural poor in their quest for power, or as 
Frazer puts it, they became a “reserve army of the unemployed.”211 However, the elites 
that exploited the lower class bandits did not realize how big of a problem organized 
crime would eventually become.212 As organized crime escalated to substantial heights of 
power and influence in Mexico and Colombia, the governments were compelled to take 
action, but to what extent and why? 
4. Government Reactions 
This section will discuss the government reactions to organized crime over time 
and the stimulating factors for their reactions. Following suit with the rest of this paper, it 
will begin with Colombia and then shift focus to Mexico. One of the major contributing 
factors to government reaction to organized crime in Colombia was external pressure—
specifically from the United States. After President Samper was discovered to be 
involved with drug traffickers, the U.S. threatened Colombia with various sanctions due 
to their negligent attitude towards the illicit market.213 Concerning these sanctions, 
Restrepo and Guizado state, “These measures represented a double threat to Colombia’s 
institutional stability: highly placed Colombian officials and politicians were virtually 
being denounced as accomplices of the drug barons, and as a result the country’s 
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reputation suffered a severe blow in the eyes of the rest of the world.”214 This incident 
involving President Samper not only created external pressures, but internal pressure as 
well by shifting public opinion in Colombia; the combination of both forced the 
government to take action against the drug trafficking organizations.215 
In Mexico, government reaction is very similar to that in Colombia. They are only 
willing to combat the drug industry when they receive external pressure, when violence 
exceeds tolerable limits, or during shifts in political parties—which often coincides with 
a rise in violence.216 Astorga discusses the five stages of drug trafficking in Mexico, 
stating that the first involved the establishment of the patron-client relationship with the 
PRI.217 Second was the rise in the role of the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) and 
the DFS in combatting the illicit drug market, which “extended the social groups that 
could benefit economically.”218 The third was the beginning of U.S. involvement and 
included Operation Intercept and Operation Condor in the 1960s and 70s, and began after 
a rise in violence between traffickers and Mexican officials.219 Note, this rise in violence 
occurred after a rise in demand from the U.S. market.220 The fourth stage began with the 
assassination of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena and 
Mexican pilot Alfredo Zavala, which created increased external and internal pressure to 
combat drug trafficking.221 The fifth stage involved the decrease in prominence of the 
PRI throughout Mexico, which coincided with the end of subordinating the drug 
trafficking organizations (DTOs), and a rise in violence as DTOs fought for control over 
drug routes.222 In summary, government reactions against organized crime—specifically 
drug trafficking—has been a result of external pressures, increased violence, and the 
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breakdown of PRI control. Early in Mexican history, the government resorted to 
emergency decrees and implementation of the colonial penal code to deal with banditry, 
but continuous political contention and weakness prohibited their effectiveness. This 
continued through the 1800s and into the early 20th century, and the government 
primarily opposed banditry, because they saw it as an obstacle in the modernization 
process.223 Understanding these government reactions provides insights for policy 
development. 
This section found that Colombia and Mexico have various similarities, including 
government relations with organized crime groups. Colombia also has factors that cannot 
be controlled, like geography, and the issues this presents for government presence and 
control of territory. Furthermore, the responses of these two countries’ governments to 
organized crime were similar in nature and often involved external pressures from the 
United States. However, based off the differences like geography, economies, 
governments, etc., they should not be treated or have similar anti-drug policies as each 
other. Francisco Thoumi provides an important lesson about understanding the 
foundations of organized crime and the policies to combat organized crime by stating, 
“Violence and drugs are the result of a complex set of forces including economic ones 
but also each country’s productive structure, culture and institutions. Because of this 
transferring social policy recipes from one country to another is always dangerous.”224 In 
order to establish effective policies, one must understand the nature of the problem, and 
avoid a one-size-fits-all approach. 
D. MÉRIDA INITIATIVE RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Analyzing resource allocation in the Mérida Initiative is a crucial step in 
understanding its effectiveness. A 2010 GAO report cited allocation and spending of 
Mérida funds as an underlying issue with its progress.225 This section will analyze the 
                                                 
223 Frazer, Bandit Nation: A History of Outlaws and Cultural Struggle in Mexico, 1810–1920, 22–23. 
224 Thoumi, “Colombian Organized Crime: From Drug Trafficking to Parastatal Bands and 
Widespread Corruption,” 143. 
225 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures by Jess T. Ford, 11.  
 58 
allocation of resources throughout the Mérida Initiative, which will include funding, 
equipment, and training. By providing this data, one can perhaps identify a link between 
resources and effectiveness of this policy. Furthermore, one can identify whether the 
resources match the four overall pillars of the initiative. 
1. Funding 
This section will focus solely on the funding for Mérida Initiative, which includes 
allocated, obligated, and expended funds. Specifically, this section can exhibit which of 
the aforementioned pillars was most important, or at least which one received the most 
focus, to policy makers based off funding. 
One of the criticisms of the Mérida Initiative was spending the money in a timely 
and efficient manner, which was even expressed by then Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton during a trip to Mexico in March of 2009.226 As of March 31, 2010, of the $1.6 
billion initially allocated for the Mérida Initiative, $1.322 billion was allocated to Mexico 
and the remainder to Central American countries.227 Of this $1.322 billion, only $669 
million was obligated and only $121 million was expended; that is approximately 9 
percent of funding being utilized after more than a year into the initiative (see Table 3).228 
Furthermore, according to a 2015 CRS Report, “Between FY2008 and FY2015, Congress 
appropriated roughly $2.5 billion for Mérida Initiative programs in Mexico. Of that total, 
more than $1.3 billion worth of training, equipment, and technical assistance has been 
provided,” which reveals that initial obstacles were never fully overcome.229 However, 
State Department argues “that expenditure levels alone are not an accurate measure of 
progress on program delivery.”230 As stated in a Government Accountability Report, 
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“expended funds do not capture all program activity because of timing issues associated 
with procurement, billing and reporting systems of State and Department of Defense 
(DOD). Officially funds are considered expended when payment has been made from the 
U.S. Treasury.”231 They go on to state that these issues are due to a variety of factors that 
can delay the actual accounting of the money being spent.232 That being said, even if the 
full $2.5 billion appropriated for Mérida Initiative was expended, it would account for 
about 3 percent of the total funds spent on Mexican security and public safety, because 
Mexico invested $79 billion of its own resources.233 
Table 3. Mérida Initiative Spending as of March 31, 2010 (in Millions of U.S. 
Dollars) 
 Allocated Obiligated Expended 
Mexico    
FY08 Supplemental $398.0 $290.9 $107.1 
FY09 Omnibus $300.0 $44.1 $2.7 
FY09 Supplemental $420.0 $330.1 $6.4 
FY10 $204.3 $4.6 $5.0 
Mexico total $1,322.3 $669.7 $121.2 
Data from U.S. Government Accountability Office, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures by Jess T. Ford. 
(GAO-10-837) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), 11. 
 
The next area to be analyzed is the specific departments responsible for expending 
the funds, which also reveals the primary focus of the initiative. Funding to Mexico 
between FY2007 and FY2014 was split into seven different areas. These are International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Economic Support Fund (ESF), 
Foreign Military Fund (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), 
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs (NADR), Global Health and 
                                                 
231 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures by Jess T. Ford, 12.  
232 Ibid. 
233 Seelke and Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, CRS 
Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 7, 2015), 1.   
 60 
Child Survival (GHCS), and Development Assistance (DA).234 The Mérida Initiative 
funds went primarily into INCLE, ESF, and FMF, and also consisted of the majority of 
the money that went to Mexico (see Table 4). Furthermore, the three peak years for the 
Mérida Initiative funding was FY2008-FY2010 with a slight resurgence in FY2012.235 
That being said, one can assert that the primary focus of the Mérida Initiative was on 
supplying and training law enforcement agencies and the military in Mexico, while ESF 
rarely exceeded 10 percent of funding during this time frame. Furthermore, in a 2005 
U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide, ESF “promotes the economic and political 
foreign policy interests of the United States,” and most of the funding is utilized by the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).236 More than likely this funding 
was used for training purposes, which will be addressed in further detail in an upcoming 
section. In a 2015 CRS Report, the author states, “From FY2012 onward, funds provided 
for pillar two have exceeded all other aid categories.”237 After analyzing this data, one 
can assert that the majority of funding for the Mérida Initiative was focused on the first 
two pillars. While the last two appear to be neglected or perhaps were too difficult to 
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Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007–FY2014 (in Millions 
of U.S. Dollars) 




INCLE 36.7 242.1 454.0 365.0 117.0 248.5 195.1 148.1 90 
ESF 11.4 34.7 15.0 15.0 18.0 33.3 32.1 46.1 35.0 
FMF 0.0 116.5 299.0 5.3 8.0 7.0 6.6 7.0 5.0 
IMET 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5 
NADR 1.3 1.4 3.9 3.9 5.7 5.4 3.8 3.9 2.9 
GHCS 3.7 2.7 2.9 3.5 3.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DA 12.3 8.2 11.2 10.0 25.0 33.4 26.2 0.0 12.5 
TOTAL 65.4 405.9 786.8 403.7 178.2 329.6 265.0 206.5 136.9 
Data from Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida 
Initiative and Beyond, CRS Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, April 8, 2014), 36. 
 
2. Equipment 
 Along with funding, shipment of equipment from the United States to Mexico 
also took longer than initially expected. According to a 2010 GAO report, a lot of 
equipment had not shipped yet, and even more worrisome, did not have an estimated 
delivery date (see Tables 5 and 6).238 Also similar to funding, a majority of the 
equipment that was part of the Mérida Initiative was military equipment that would aid in 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of DTOs, or for detection of illicit goods 
during transportation. This equipment included polygraph units, X-ray units, aircraft, and 
communications gear.239 The tables alone do not provide a clear picture for the 
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Table 5. Selected Equipment Delivered to Mexico, as of March 31, 2010 
Equipment Delivery Date 
26 armored vehicles May 2009 
62 Plataforma Mexico computer servers June 2009 
Training equipment July & December 2009 
5 X-ray vans August 2009 
OASISS servers and software August 2009 
Biometric equipment September 2009 & January 2010 
Document verification software September 2009 
Ballistic tracing equipment (IBIS) September 2009 
30 ion scanners October 2009 
Rescue communication equipment & 
training 
October & November 2009 
Personal protective equipment October & November 2009 
5 Bell helicopters December 2009 
10 Mobile X-ray minivans December 2009 
Constanza software February 2010 
100 Polygraph units March 2010 
13 armored Suburbans April 2010 
Data from U.S. Government Accountability Office, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures by Jess T. Ford. 
(GAO-10-837) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), 8. 
 
The same 2010 GAO report expands upon this data singling out the use of Bell 
helicopters for troop transport in military operations against DTOs and the utilization of 
biometric equipment to collect data of immigrants entering the country, which is then 
stored in a nationwide database using the servers and software provided. However, they 
do not go into detail on the utilization of equipment to improve the criminal justice 
system, due process, and intelligence collection and surveillance to secure the transport of 
illicit goods. It appears that in a similar fashion as funding, the primary focus of 
equipment procurement was to support the first two pillars. Despite initial delays, 




training, and technical assistance was provided.240 The CRS report expands upon this 
data by stating, “As of the end of Calderón’s term (November 2012), $1.1 billion worth 
of assistance had been provided.”  
Table 6. Selected Equipment Pending Delivery to Mexico, as of March 31, 
2010 
Equipment Estimated Delivery Date 
218 Polygraph Units April 2010 
2 Railroad X-Ray Inspection Units August 2010 
2 Bell Helicopters October 2010 
3 Black Hawk Helicopters (SSP) October to December 2010 
Mobile Gamma Radiation Trucks 2010 
3 Black Hawk Helicopters (SEMAR) September 2011 
4 CASA Airplanes September to December 2011 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance Aircraft 
2011 
3 to 5 Black Hawk Helicopters (SSP) No estimated delivery date 
Additional equipment for Mexican National 
Data System 
No estimated delivery date 
Additional equipment for Mexican 
Communication and Transportation 
Secretariat  
No estimated delivery date 
1 Bell Helicopter No estimated delivery date 
Data from U.S. Government Accountability Office, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures by Jess T. Ford. 
(GAO-10-837) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), 25. 
 
That total included roughly $873.7 million in equipment (including 20 aircraft and 
more than $100 million in non-intrusive inspection equipment) and $146.0 million in 
training.241 These numbers emphasize the point that a majority of Mérida Initiative funds 
went to equipment. More specifically, they went to military equipment meant to support 
military and law enforcement operations against DTOs. However, in a 2015 CRS Report, 
the author states, “It is unclear, though, whether more expeditious equipment deliveries to 
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Mexico have resulted in a more positive evaluation of Mérida. Moreover, if equipment is 
not adequately maintained, its long-term impact could be reduced.”242 Therefore, in a 
similar evaluation to allocation of funding for programs, equipment, and training, one can 
assert that timeliness of equipment delivery to Mexico did not necessarily adversely 
impact the results of the Mérida Initiative. It appears that improperly addressing the key 
factors that contribute to the prevalence of DTOs in Mexico and their participation in 
feeding U.S. drug demand. 
3. Training 
 Training was no different than the last two areas discussed. Various delays 
frustrated the Mexican government and prohibited progress for Mérida. In the 2010 GAO 
Report, the author states, “Mexican officials told us that they were frustrated by the lack 
of information on the time frame for delivery and said they need this information to be 
able to proceed with other programs that they are implementing in conjunction with 
Mérida.”243 Similar to equipment allocation, the training conducted in Mexico focused 
on the first two pillars with many of the community building programs having no 
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Table 7. Selected Training Delivered to Mexico, as of March 31, 2010 
Training Delivery Date 
230 Officials attending arms trafficking conferences April 2009 to October 
2009 
187 Mexican Ministry of Public Safety (SSP) officers 
trained in corrections instruction and classification 
April 2009 to December 
2009 
United Nation’s human rights project inaugurated July 2009 
4,392 SSP investigators trained July 2009 to January 2010 
USAID training for capacity building programs 
throughout Mexico for over 10,000 Mexican officials 
• Citizen participation councils 
• Victim protection and restitution 
• Judicial exchanges 
• Trafficking in persons 
• Human rights 
• Pre-trial services and case resolution alternatives 
• Continuing education for police, prosecutors and 
other officials 
• Penal reform 
August 2009 to March 
2010 
Over 200 Mexican prosecutors and investigators trained 
in trial advocacy, trafficking in persons and extradition 
September 2009 to March 
2010 
28 canine trainers trained October 2009 to April 
2010 
293 mid-level and senior-level SSP officers trained October 2009 to December 
2009 
45 Mexican state officials trained in anti-kidnapping November 2009 to January 
2010 
Data from U.S. Government Accountability Office, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures by Jess T. Ford. 
(GAO-10-837) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), 8. 
 
Furthermore, the Government Accountability Office reveals weaknesses in the 
State Departments’ performance tracking for the Mérida Initiative. The authors of a 2010 
GAO Report state, “Most of the indicators that State has developed for Mexico only 
measure the outputs of the Mérida Initiative, such as the number of officials trained,” and 
they go on to state, “State’s performance indicators measure the number of Mexican law 
enforcement officials trained under Mérida, but do not measure the impact of the training 
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and if it has been successfully employed.”244 Despite initial delays in training and lack of 
performance measures on the State Department’s part, training did progress throughout 
the next few years but remained unrefined. 
In a 2014 CRS Report, the authors cite $146.0 million worth of training being 
spent by November 2010.245 However, the training focused heavily on strengthening 
Mexico’s criminal justice system and did little to improve underlying factors for drug 
trafficking and involvement in DTOs.246 According to the same report, “As of May 2013, 
some 19,000 law enforcement officers (including 4,000 federal police investigators) had 
completed U.S. courses. Another 8,500 federal and 22,500 state justice sector personnel 
had received training on their roles in Mexico’s new accusatorial justice system.”247 
Lastly, despite the progress this training may have contributed to Mexico’s criminal 
justice system, the CRS report counters by stating, “Despite these numbers, high turnover 
rates within Mexican criminal justice institutions, particularly since the transition from a 
PAN to a PRI government has limited the impact of some U.S. training programs.”248 
This appears to be a major obstacle in training provide under the Mérida Initiative. 
United States and Mexico must assure, or at least attempt, to ensure continuity between 
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Table 8. Selected Equipment and Training Pending Delivery to Mexico, as of 
March 31, 2010 
Training Delivery Date 
Various training expected, for example  
- Drug demand reduction No estimated delivery date 
- Financial intelligence unit & financial crimes No estimated delivery date 
- Support for law schools and bar associations No estimated delivery date 
- Institution building and rule of law No estimated delivery date 
- Stand up robust internal controls No estimated delivery date 
Data from U.S. Government Accountability Office, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures by Jess T. Ford. 
(GAO-10-837) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), 25. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has examined the goals of the Mérida Initiative, made an in-depth 
comparison between Plan Colombia and Mérida Initiative, and finally analyzed the 
allocation of resources for Mérida Initiative. This chapter identifies a few key issues with 
the Mérida Initiative as a policy. First, although the initiative appears to address 
fundamental issues within Mexico as presented in chapter two, it is implemented in a 
similar fashion to Plan Colombia. Second, a comparison between Mexico and Colombia 
reveals that these two countries are dealing with a different set of challenges, and similar 
anti-drug policies should not be used in these two countries. Third, although timeliness of 
resource allocation was an initial problem for the Mérida Initiative, a closer examination 
reveals that the funds, equipment, and training are minute in relation to the overall 
resources expended in Mexico and that they primarily focus on the first two pillars. 
Furthermore, based on the evidence presented thus far, training is one of the most 
valuable assets the U.S. can provide in Mexico beyond focusing on dual border 
management to sustain economic prosperity and addressing internal issues such as 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 This thesis posed the following research question: Did funding and allocation of 
resources of the Mérida Initiative address the underlying issues that contributed to the 
drug trade in Mexico? This thesis examined the historical foundations of the drug trade 
ranging from Mexico’s weak institutions to the effects of anti-drug policies in other parts 
of Latin America to United States’ weak gun legislation. Furthermore, it addressed 
Mexico’s ability to combat DTOs by examining claims that Mexico is a failing state and 
requires intervention to prevent non-state actors from gaining control. Lastly, this thesis 
explored the goals of the Mérida Initiative through multiple administrations, compared 
Mexico to Colombia, and examined the allocation of resources over time. This conclusive 
chapter will examine all this data and analysis and address the research question 
established in the first chapter. In order to do this, this chapter will take a final look at 
‘one-size-fits-all’ drug policy used on both Colombia and Mexico, examine the effects of 
delayed resource allocation, and provide a final analysis and recommendations for future 
drug policy in Mexico, which can also be applied abroad. 
A. MEXICO IS NOT COLOMBIA 
One of the fundamental issues with the Mérida Initiative is its similarity to Plan 
Colombia. In Chapter III, this thesis provided an in-depth analysis of Mexico and 
Colombia and the anti-drug policies implemented in both countries. This chapter found 
that both countries had different challenges to address; that U.S. contributions in 
Colombia had a larger impact; that both countries had economic, political, and social 
factors that contributed to the rise of organized crime; and that U.S. demand for drugs 
was an underlying factor in both country’s difficulties with organized crime. Concerning 
the policy for Plan Colombia, John Bailey writes, “Plan Colombia covered five areas: the 
peace process, economic growth, anti-drug production and trafficking, reform of justice 
and protection of human rights, and democracy-promotion and social development.”249  
As a reminder, the four pillars for MI are disrupting the operational capacity of organized 
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criminal groups, institutionalizing reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for 
human rights in Mexico, building a 21st century border, and build strong and resilient 
communities. The issue with the similarity in policies is that these two countries are not 
alike and do not require similar policies. The major difference between these two policies 
stems from a shared border between Mexico and the United States, but beyond that they 
have similar focus and approach to alleviate drug trafficking within their countries. 
Colombia’s issue was an insurgency that had a legitimate ability and opportunity to take 
control of large portions of Colombian territory and even overthrow the government.250 
As discussed in Chapter II, Mexico was not in danger of becoming a failed state and 
continuously had the ability to combat DTOs. They did not require an anti-insurgency 
policy like Colombia, but needed one that focused on the true underlying issues: weak 
institutions, corruption, economic inequality, and U.S. domestic issues. Despite the 
appearance of a package that addresses some of these issues, the Mérida Initiative 
continually focuses on combatting DTOs through use of military and law enforcement.  
Furthermore, multiple scholars have shown disdain for the policy similarities and 
success in general. On this topic, Arturo Sotomayor writes, “Plan Colombia had no effect 
on the price, purity, and availability of cocaine and heroin in the U.S.”251 Therefore, 
despite the rhetoric establishing Plan Colombia as an anti-drug policy, it had little to no 
effect on the drug market in the United States. Similarly, Brian Bow asserts, “Others 
condemned the Plan Colombia model, because it led in the short run to an explosive 
increase in violence and to the militarization of law enforcement and other government 
agencies, yet it failed to actually diminish the overall scale of the drug industry in 
Colombia.”252 This is a similar phenomenon as seen in Mexico with an increase in 
violence, militarization of law enforcement, and overall inability to suppress drug 
presence. Lastly, Shannon O’Neil comments, “Most important, the focus of this aid is too 
narrow, reflecting a misunderstanding of Mexico’s fundamental challenge. Unlike 
Colombia, which had to retake vast swaths of territory from guerilla groups, paramilitary 
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organizations, and drug cartels, the Mexican state has been able to quell the rising 
violence when it has deployed large and well-armed military units…Firepower is not the 
main issue; sustainability is.”253 These comments point out one of the underlying issues 
with an approach similar to Plan Colombia. Despite the appearance of success in Mexico 
through the use of advanced weaponry and tactics the overall success of a plan like this 
lacks the long-term sustainability due to the remaining presence of economic inequality 
and a weak criminal justice system. The drug market has proven the balloon effect time 
and again, and combating DTOs head-to-head will only displace the problem, because the 
demand exists, and it presents economic stimulation for the impoverished. 
B. TIMELINESS DOES NOT MATTER 
As briefly discussed in Chapter III, the timeliness of fund allocation for the 
Mérida Initiative did not play a major role in its success or failure. The State Department 
has argued that expenditure levels do not accurately reflect delivery of goods and services 
due to various factors with the billing process, multiple State bureau involvement, and a 
new fund tracking system.254 Furthermore, as stated previously, the amount of funds 
expended for the Mérida Initiative paled in comparison to the funds expended by Mexico 
over the same time period. In total, U.S. appropriated support only accounted for 3 
percent of the funds expended for anti-drug policy. Even more disconcerting, the United 
States was only able to expend approximately half of the appropriated funds, making 
their contributions even more negligible. Even according to Mexico, the issue was not 
with the pace of delivery, but with the lack of information sharing concerning delivery. In 
a 2010 GAO report, the authors cite, “Mexican officials told us that they were frustrated 
by the lack of information on the time frame for delivery and said they need this 
information to be able to proceed with other programs that they are implementing in 
conjunction with Mérida.”255 Mexico has the capacity to fund and wage this war, but 
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depends on the United States’ promise to support their cause through equipment and 
training.  
Furthermore, this thesis spoke briefly about the likelihood of Mexico becoming a 
failed state and through the use of scholarly debate and evidence ruled this out. However, 
Mexico does need help, but it is not with controlling territory or the people of the state—
it is with the criminal justice system. The Mexican government has drawn criticism for 
the weakness of law enforcement and the judicial system. David A. Shirk, for example, 
writes, “In a 2007 Gallup poll, only 37% of Mexicans responded positively to the 
question, ‘do you have confidence in Mexico’s judicial system?,’ while 58% said ‘no’ 
and 4% ‘don’t know.’”256 Possibly even more alarming, only 10 percent of Mexicans 
have some or much confidence in police agencies.257 The opinions of the Mexican people 
are based on two major factors, first, that the police don’t possess the ability to solve the 
crimes, and two, that they are corrupt.258 This has led to the involvement of the armed 
forces in roles typically held by law enforcement—specifically in anti-drug operations.259 
The unwanted side effect of this is the tarnishing of the armed forces reputation due to an 
increase in human rights violations.260 The United States needs to keep this in mind and 
keep the focus on training and judicial reform in Mexico—not delivery of military 
equipment. The issue that weak law enforcement and judiciary presents is that despite the 
arrest of organized crime members, the majority of them end up being released. 
According to Paul Kenny and Monica Serrano, “Of the 70,000 members of organized 
criminal groups arrested from 2007 into early 2010, the expert calculation is that 98 
percent were released for want of evidence to bring their cases to trial.”261 This is one of 
the major problems that Mexico is faced with. Despite the delivery of equipment—late or 
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timely—Mexico is unable to put members of organized criminal groups behind bars due 
to corruption and inefficiency.  
This section concluded that timeliness of deliveries is not as detrimental to the 
success of Mérida as addressing the root of the problems. Despite the United States being 
able to deliver equipment used for surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence 
collection, the inability for law enforcement and the judicial system to prosecute 
criminals is inhibiting the initiative’s success. Furthermore, the amount of money (for 
equipment and training) that the United States is contributing to the anti-drug effort in 
Mexico is miniscule in comparison to the amount the Mexican government has 
contributed. What the United States can contribute and what Mexico needs is proper 
training, and to temporarily extradite criminals to the United States for prosecution and 
punishment, which a treaty signed in 1978 allows.262 The total number of extraditions 
over a 20 year period (1995-2014) only totals 986 individuals.263 However, this would be 
better suited as a temporary solution for high profile arrests due to the lack of capability 
of the Mexican criminal justice system, but they must continue to develop their capacity 
through U.S. involvement and training.264 Repairing the criminal justice system is 
perhaps one of the most important steps that the United States and Mexico must take to 
win the war on drugs. 
C. FINAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Based on the evidence presented in this thesis, the Mérida Initiative did not 
address the underlying issues that contributed to the drug trade in Mexico. Although 
various iterations of the initiative use language that imparts the impression these issues 
are being addressed, an examination of the allocation of resources reveals that law 
enforcement or direct conflict with DTOs receives the majority of the focus. This thesis 
has reinforced the need for continued cooperation between the United States and Mexico 
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with an increased focus on improving the criminal justice system, addressing U.S. 
domestic issues, which includes arms control, drug demand, and money laundering, as 
well as a shared responsibility over the border to allow commerce to prosper while 
decreasing flow of illegal goods—both North and South. Furthermore, the money being 
spent to arm Mexican troops should be utilized to improve social programs in Mexico, 
decrease income inequality, and provide opportunities for lower income individuals. This 
section will take a final look at alternate solutions for Mérida Initiative and future policies 
based off the research of scholars. 
1. Improving Mexico’s Criminal Justice System 
One of the crucial areas for improvement, as noted by scholars, is the 
improvement of Mexico’s criminal justice system. This area is important to focus on, 
because continued use of the military will only scar their reputation and increase human 
rights abuses.265 Furthermore, direct conflict with DTOs has only fragmented their 
organizations and increased violence as they vie for territorial control.266 The United 
States should focus on providing the training and resources necessary to improve 
Mexico’s criminal justice system, provide extradition resources for high profile cases, 
and encourage Mexico to not utilize the military in domestic issues. On the topic of law 
enforcement, Laurie Freeman and Jorge Luis Sierra advocate an absence of military 
involvement similar to U.S. practices: 
The United States should promote the establishment of clear legal 
divisions between the military and police roles in Mexico modeled after 
Posse Comitatus, the U.S. law forbidding U.S. troops from making arrests 
or conducting searches or seizures within U.S. territory that would 
eliminate military participation in law enforcement. U.S. drug control 
programs that take advantage of the absence of such legislation in Mexico 
and encourage the involvement of the military in domestic law 
enforcement prevent this democratic principle from taking root.267  
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Furthermore, addressing the weakness of the criminal justice system will require 
addressing corruption on all levels of this system. In 2008 and 2009, a corruption purge 
called ‘Operation Cleanup’ exposed various high ranking officials for forms of 
corruption, which included “Mexico’s drug czar in the 1990s, two former directors of 
Interpol Mexico, personnel in the office of the Attorney General’s special prosecutor 
against organized crime.”268 A monumental endeavor such as reviving Mexico’s criminal 
justice system will require sustained focus and resources, which is crucial for the United 
States to be involved with. While they are training the various institutions involved and 
restructuring the process, they must provide extradition resources for high-profile arrests. 
Furthermore, they need to remain patient since this will be a long process. John Bailey 
recognizes the challenges and provides insight by stating, “First, the scope of the 
institutional reforms needed to reconstruct Mexico’s national police, reorient the justice 
system from an inquisitorial to an adversarial (accusatory) model, build an intelligence 
system, and integrate the national, state, and local security apparatus requires decades, 
even at the best of circumstances.”269  
In closing, the United States should provide training at all levels of criminal 
justice to increase the efficacy of criminal investigations; Mexico must continue to 
address corruption, address its over-crowded prison system, and should avoid the use of 
its military in domestic matters, but utilize the lessons learned to train its police force; 
and both sides must have patience for this process to take effect. 
2. United States Domestic Issues 
Another major area of focus among scholars is U.S. domestic issues that are 
fueling the drug trade and a primary focus of the shared responsibility tenant of the 
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Mérida Initiative.270 Specifically, these areas are U.S. demand, gun control, and money 
smuggling. On the topic of reducing drug demand, a study done by C. Peter Rydell, 
Jonathan P. Caulkins, and Susan S. Everingham found that “treating heavy-users is more 
cost-effective than supply-control programs.” Peter Reuter, however, states, “A cursory 
calculation, which is the best one can do, suggests that an expansion of cocaine treatment 
places by 25%, a massive expansion by historical standards, might reduce cocaine 
consumption by only 6%.”271 On this same topic, Shannon O’Neil advocates for demand 
reduction programs citing it is five times more cost effective to treat addicts than 
conventional law enforcement.272 While drug reduction programs may not be effective in 
a traditional sense, scholarly assessments seem to agree that it is more effective than 
interdiction and a way to improve the situation in Mexico and abroad. 
On the topic of gun control, scholars tend to agree that the United States must 
address the transportation of U.S. origin weapons across the border. One report cites 90–
95 percent of cartel weapons originated in the United States, while other estimates are 
around 70 percent of all illegal weapons, which is about 20,000 guns each year.273 Either 
way, this is an issue that needs to be addressed by the United States by increasing 
resources and altering legislation. Shannon O’Neil suggests that one solution would be to 
increase resources going to the ATF.274 To be discussed in the following section, 
increasing resources and technology on the border would help decrease the southern flow 
of illicit goods like firearms. Furthermore, legislation should be amended to avoid the 
loopholes that allow for the purchase and shipment of these weapons. On this topic, 
Stephanie Brewer states, “The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) 
estimates that 90–95% of Mexican cartels’ weapons enter Mexico from the southern 
United States, where individual buyers, benefiting from gaping loopholes in U.S. gun 
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laws, purchase multiple military weapons from gun sellers and then pass the weapons to 
drug cartels.”275 Addressing this area is one of the many ways that the United States can 
support their end of the ‘shared responsibility’ approach of the Mérida Initiative. 
On the topic of money smuggling, estimates vary but put the total amount of 
money smuggled across the border between $15 and $25 billion a year.276 This provides 
the resources and the motivation necessary to continue the drug trade and needs to be 
addressed by the United States. Similar to firearms smuggling, some of this can be 
addressed by improving current infrastructure on the border, but the United States must 
also address money laundering. According to O’Neil, “Federal investigators believe that 
over the course of a few years, Mexico’s criminal organizations laundered billions of 
dollars through bulk cash and wire transfers via Wachovia Bank (now part of Wells 
Fargo) alone.”277 This may prove to be difficult and involve oversight in countless 
financial institutions and business and may best be prevented through training and 
increased resources on the border to increase the difficulty and ingenuity required to 
either smuggle or launder cash from drug proceeds on U.S. soil. Nevertheless, it is one of 
the areas that must be addressed by the United States to support Mexico. 
3. Improving Border Security and Efficiency 
Various scholars see the importance of increased border security, infrastructural 
improvements, and maintaining commerce. As stated previously, the United States and 
Mexico trade $500 billion annually as a result of NAFTA, which leaves shutting down 
the border out of the question.278 In an article titled, “The U.S. and Mexican Cooperation: 
The Merida Initiative and Beyond,” Tekin writes, “Border and public security are very 
important for the US; therefore, rather than having the police force at the border as 
proposed by the Obama administration, border control should be done through U.S. 
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military officers.”279 She goes on to cite the success that “Operation Jump Start,” in 
which 6,000 National Guard troops were sent to the southern border, which resulted in a 
reduction of illegal drug trafficking and drug related violence.280 This mission went on 
between 2006 and 2008, but one must question the long term sustainability and cost 
effectiveness of utilizing troops to support border patrol.281 Shannon O’Neil recommends 
improving border infrastructure and states, “The U.S. Department of Transportation 
currently estimates that $11 billion more will need to be spent on the U.S. side of the 
border to catch up with the growing traffic.”282 This is a large expense to improve a dated 
infrastructure but necessary to ensure safety and sustained flow of legal goods. Lastly, 
Olson and Lee observe the benefits of implementing technology in the border regions to 
increase border security, and see this as an area for increased focus.283 In the case of 
Mexico, the United States should keep the border as an area of focus, improve 
infrastructure, and inject technology to improve efficiency and decrease manpower and 
cost. Due to the high levels of trade between these two countries, this is an important 
investment for improving security, maintaining flow of legal goods, and decreasing the 
flow of illicit goods both North and South.  
4. Investing in Mexico’s Social Programs 
The final area that the United States and Mexico can focus on to diminish the 
drug trade is economic development and social programs in Mexico. Concerning the 
importance of social programs to combat organized crime, Vanda Felbab-Brown states, 
“There are good reasons to incorporate socioeconomic policies into efforts to combat 
organized crime. Populations in areas of inadequate state presence, poverty, and social 
and political marginalization are often dependent on illicit economies, including drug 
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trade, for the satisfaction of their socioeconomic needs, including livelihoods and social 
advancement.”284 Furthermore, Yasemin Tekin states, “the U.S. should take measures to 
improve economic growth in Mexico in order to eradicate one of the root causes of the 
problem, poverty.”285 To achieve this, she suggests various incentive programs that the 
government could utilize to encourage corporations and firms to invest or relocate, which 
would benefit both U.S. and Mexican workers. She believes these programs would 
strengthen the Mexican economy and eventually attract foreign investors from abroad. 
Lastly, she encourages utilizing Mexican territory to attract investments from renewable 
energy businesses, which would be a long-term enhancement to the Mexican economy. 
She closes by stating, “Thus, with greater economic development, Mexican people will 
have less incentive to engage in criminal behavior and violence, as their new jobs will 
pay more than the organized drug trade ever could.”286 Although I do not completely 
agree with her last statement—the DTOs could pay more than their wages—it would 
further impede organized criminal groups from recruiting individuals. Felbab-Brown 
recognizes the need for such programs, but understands it is not a replacement for 
security:  
Socioeconomic programs for reducing violence are not a substitute for 
security. In fact, they are often dependent on the establishment of greater 
security on the ground to have a chance to take off at all. If an urban sector 
continues to experience intense warfare among criminal groups that law 
enforcement institutions or the military are unable to suppress, few but 
illegal economies will thrive. However, if designed as a comprehensive 
social development effort and executed well, such programs reinforce the 
bonds between communities and the state, and critically hamper the 
operational space of criminal groups. Thus, they reduce the negative 
effects of criminal groups on both national security and the community’s 
social fabric.287 
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Lastly, in a 2015 CRS report, the author recognizes the success of similar social 
development programs by referencing ‘Todos Somos Juarez’ (‘We are all Juárez), which 
was implemented to address the high levels of violence in Ciudad Juárez in 2010.288 This 
program utilized $400 million in federal investments, and although its contributions in 
the successful reduction in violence are ambiguous, the report cites, “lessons have been 
gleaned from this example of Mexican and U.S. involvement in municipal crime 
prevention that are informing newer programs in Mexico and Central America.”289 Social 
programs serve as one of the many tools that the United States and Mexico should 
continue to focus on to reduce the effects of drug trafficking in this region. 
5. Closing Remarks 
This thesis concludes that the Mérida Initiative did not address the underlying 
issues that contribute to the drug trade in Mexico, but the United States and Mexico must 
continue to pursue a ‘shared responsibility’ approach to addressing this issue. 
Furthermore, it has provided various means for addressing this issue, which should be 
used in combination to reduce the effects of the drug trade in this region. By addressing 
these underlying issues that contribute to the problem, one can expect lower levels of 
violence, reduced drug demand, less income inequality in Mexico, increased flow of 
commerce and decreased flow of illicit goods, lower levels of corruption in Mexico’s 
institutions, and stronger communities that don’t tolerate the presence of organized crime. 
While no policy can be expected to alleviate an issue overnight, the governments should 
utilize a similar phased approach to implement anti-drug policies. First, understand the 
underlying issues that contribute to the drug trade. Second, examine historical cases of 
success and failure. Finally, implement a policy that takes these factors into account and 
avoid the one-size-fits-all approach that has been used in the past. 
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